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I. THE PROBLEM 
Paul Bunyan once told his camp that if ten loggers shouting 
together could be heard ten times farther away than one logger 
shouting alone, then ten loggers listening together should be able 
to hear something ten times farther away than one logger listen-
ing alone. This is a political fable. 
In general, when things are done by vote (even by an indirect 
vote of representatives), we believe that our voice is increased 
when people vote with us. Like Paul Bunyan, we believe that 
there is strength in numbers. A close look at the process by 
which we amend the federal constitution, however, reveals a 
counterexample that tries our faith. We find an exception where 
there should be none, unlike Paul Bunyan who had the sturdy 
faith to stand by his rule when there should be an exception. 
To amend the federal Constitution, we need the assent of two-
thirds of each house of Congress and three-fourths of the states.1 
This Article focuses on the three-fourths requirement for the 
states. This threshold is particularly high, and it suggests that 
constitutional amendment is very difficult. In fact, amendment 
is difficult in different degrees for different constituencies, de-
pending not on their numbers but on where they live. 
t Copyright c 1987 by Peter Suber. 
• Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Earlham College. Ph.D., 1978, J.D., 1982, North-
western University. 
1. The amending process is laid out in article V, as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof .... 
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
409 
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The three-fourths requirement does not dictate the size of the 
body that may amend the Constitution, only its distribution. If a 
majority of Americans is squeezed into fewer than three-fourths 
of the states, it will be powerless to amend the Constitution. In 
contrast, if a tiny minority of Americans is spread throughout 
more than three-fourths of the states, it will be able to adopt an 
amendment against the will of the remaining "supermajority."2 
Suppose that three-fourths of the population of the United 
States migrated to California, which then renamed itself "New 
California." Using the present methods of constitutional amend-
ment, the other forty-nine states could adopt an amendment 
over New California's dissent, and could block or veto an 
amendment over New California's assent. New California's citi-
zens could support their state's assent or dissent unanimously 
and intensely without increasing its voice in the slightest. New 
California would be just as powerless in the amending process 
and could just as easily be outvoted and vetoed if it contained 
99.99 % of the national population. The reason is simply that ar-
ticle V asks for the assent of three-fourths of the states without 
regard to population. Article V requires the assent of a 
supermajority of states, not that of a supermajority of people.3 
Except in details, the case of New California is not imaginary 
and the loss of voice for a majority of Americans is not hypo-
thetical; mathematically and politically, a New California has 
existed in the United States since early in the nineteenth 
century.• 
In 1915, Joseph R. Long observed that the twelve most popu-
lous states (apparently under the 1910 census) comprised over 
half the national population.~ At that time, there were forty-
eight states. Thirty-six states thus sufficed to ratify an amend-
ment and, as Long observed, the least populous thirty-six states 
comprised a minority of the national population. Hence, in 1910, 
even the stringent three-fourths requirement would allow a mi-
2. A "supermajority" is any fraction significantly greater than half, such as two-
thirds or three-fourths. A simple majority, by contrast, is any fraction greater than half, 
no matter how small. 
3. The Supreme Court has struck down attempts to make state ratification depend 
upon a state referendum. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hawke v. 
Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); see also Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representa-
tives, 262 Mass. 603, 160 N.E. 439 (1928); State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 333 Mo. 662, 62 
S.W.2d 895, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 679 (1933). 
4. All statistical and demographic claims in this Article summarize data presented in 
the appendix. Unless otherwise noted, references to census data in the present tense are 
to 1980 figures. 
5. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 587 (1915). 
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nority of the Nation to amend the Constitution. Fifty years 
later, Charles L. Black, Jr., noted that the federal Constitution 
could be amended by a forty percent minority of the American 
people (using 1960 census data).6 
Despite these tantalizing reports, no systematic inquiry has 
been made into the data from the twenty census decades since 
the first in 1790 to determine when this loss of majority rule first 
became possible, how often it has been possible, or how small a 
minority may amend the Constitution. In addition, no system-
atic inquiry has been made into the victims and beneficiaries of 
this otherwise innocent shift of the national population into a 
few large states. Although Long, Black, and others have drawn a 
picture of the shift of political power by geography, or state of 
residence, no one has drawn the picture of the shift of power by 
political interest, economic class, or race. I have looked at the 
past 200 years of census data in order to draw this picture. This 
Article reviews the disturbing results of these inquiries, which 
include the following: 
1. The loss of majority rule in the amending process first ap-
peared in the census of 1820. It continued in 1830, disap-
peared in 1840, and has remained with us constantly since 
1850. It has existed in sixteen of the twenty census decades 
since the adoption of the Constitution. 
2. The minority of the national population that can amend the 
Constitution has shrunk in every census for more than 
three-fourths of the Nation's history. In 1820, when a minor-
ity first became able to amend the Constitution, it consti-
tuted 49.6 % of the national population. Until the twentieth 
century, the figure stayed between 46 % and 49 % . But in the 
twentieth century, the figure dropped quickly; in 1970, it 
dwindled to 39.8 % . 
3. The minority that can veto an amendment by refusing to 
ratify it has always been small and, recently, has shrunk to a 
6. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE 
L.J. 957, 959 (1963); see also w. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
234, 242-44, 246-47, 310-14 (1956). For other references, see id. at 242 n.6, 243 nn.1-4. 
Another commentator emphasized the extraordinarily small group sufficient to veto con-
stitutional amendments, rather than the minority sufficient to adopt them. Carman, 
Why and How the Present Method of Amending the Federal Constitution Should Be 
Changed, 17 OR. L. REv. 102, 102-03 (1938) (noting incorrectly that states comprising 
100,000 citizens could veto an amendment favored by states comprising 30,000,000). 
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mere sliver. The minority with veto power is the population 
of the least populous one-fourth of the states, rounded 
upwards if there is a remainder, or plus one state if there is 
not.7 In 1790, states representing only 13.32% of the na-
tional population could veto an amendment. The percentage 
has not climbed so high since then, and has not even 
reached double digits since 1820. In 1980, the census closest 
to the expiration of voting on the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA), the percentage that could veto an amendment was a 
mere 4.3 % of the national population. 
4. Although a 4 % minority can veto amendments if scattered 
throughout enough states, an absolute majority remains 
powerless to veto amendments if concentrated in too few 
(fewer than one-fourth) of the states. Presently, a veto of an 
amendment requires thirteen states. Under 1980 census 
data, the most populous thirteen states comprise an absolute 
majority of the population-as do the most populous 12, 11, 
10, and 9 states. Although these states harbor a majority of 
Americans, they are powerless to adopt or even to veto 
amendments. In contrast, a differently distributed 39 % of 
the Nation can adopt amendments and a differently distrib-
uted 4 % can veto them. 
5. Not only has majority rule vanished from the amending pro-
cess, but the resulting disregard of the one-person, one-vote 
principle has made the impact fall unevenly on different 
groups. The minority that can adopt amendments is the 
population of the least populous three-fourths (thirty-eight) 
of the states. Neither the gainers of power who live in those 
states, nor the losers of power who live in the most populous 
one-fourth (thirteen) of the states, are representative of the 
Nation.8 Most importantly, disproportionate numbers of 
American blacks, hispanics, members of labor unions, recipi-
ents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
and persons with income below the poverty line remain con-
centrated in the states that have lost the most power in the 
amending process. 
7. For example, with 50 states, 13 states ( ¼ x 50 = 12.5, rounded up to 13) are 
necessary to veto a proposed amendment. If there were 52 states, 15 states would be 
necessary (¼ x 52 = 14, plus 1 = 15). 
8. The least populous three-fourths of the states (38) and the most populous one-
fourth (13) do not add up to 50 because each number is a fraction rounded upwards. 
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I conclude that the amending process under article V serves 
federalism more than it serves democracy. When a small number 
of states contains the bulk of the population, then the amend-
ment process serves federalism at the expense of democracy. By 
"federalism" I mean the principle to treat the Nation as a feder-
ation, or as a collection of units (states) that might be of un-
equal size, rather than as a collection of people that might be 
distributed unevenly into units. I need only a minimal theory of 
democracy for the purposes of this Article, and it is the principle 
to treat people as equally significant voices in public affairs, and 
hence to weigh their voices equally in voting and other proce-
dures of change.9 
As states of unequal size joined the Union and the population 
shifted from the farmlands to the industrial areas, the United 
States population became concentrated in a comparatively few 
large states. The units of the federation became more and more 
imbalanced in population. A large state population is counted 
only once in a vote on an amendment proposal, and thus counts 
as much as the population of a much smaller state. As a result, 
the growing majority of citizens in the crowded states paid a 
price unforeseen by the framers of the Constitution: shrinking 
power in the federal amending process. Citizens in the more 
sparsely populated Stl)-tes received the corresponding boon of in-
creased power. This is undemocratic, even antidemocratic, al-
though produced by innocent migration and expansion. The ap-
pendix documents the shifts in population that brought about 
this condition. 
This A~ticle evaluates the census data from the 200 years of 
our history under article V, interprets its political significance, 
and submits a brief for legal change. Part II reviews some politi-
cal history at the time of the framing of article V, describes the 
9. In mathematical terms, which suffice here, a federation is a set of sets of people, 
while a democracy is a set of people. In a federation, votes at the "federal level" are 
taken by the sets of people, not by the people themselves. In a democracy, votes are 
taken by the people directly. In a federation, the sets of sets of people may differ in size; 
it is inessential for voting that one unit averages many voices into one and another aver-
ages very few into one. In a democracy, the people may cluster or be clustered into any 
number of groups; it is inessential for voting that the people form this or that subset for 
this or that purpose. A republic stands midway between a federation and a democracy. 
In a republic, the people are counted only in clusters (or are counted only through repre-
sentatives of clusters) when the clusters are generally of equal size. Hence, the House of 
Representatives forms a republican chamber while the Senate forms a federalist 
chamber. 
Note that I will argue only against federalism in legal change at the national level, 
including constitutional amendment, not federalism (as local autonomy and experimen-
tation) in criminal law, education, or other areas. 
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federalist and republican principles underlying the dangers dis-
cerned in article V, and offers an overview of our demographic 
history as it affects the amending process. Part III examines 
whether an amendment has been adopted by states representing 
a minority of the national population, and discusses some of the 
methodological problems of interpreting the data. Part IV de-
scribes the discriminatory- impact of the population shifts, and 
shows some of the groups that have been hurt most. In light of 
who has gained and lost power in the amending process, Part IV 
also estimates the prospects for various current amendment pro-
posals. Part V discusses constitutional amendments that could 
remedy the problems disclosed in the Article and restore democ-
racy to the amending process. The Article concludes that the 
loss of democracy and majority rule in the federal amending 
process should be remedied, and can be remedied, without jeop-
ardizing federalist principles in other departments of ·our consti-
tutional law and without departing from the intentions of the 
framers or current principles of fairness. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Some Political History, Pre-1790 
Article V embodies the federalist rationales of deference to 
state sovereignty and the institutionalization of state equality 
without regard to population. The framers clearly intended at 
least some of the resulting federalist incursions on democracy. 
The framers deliberately provided that the adoption of amend-
ments requires the assent of the states as units, not the majority 
of popular votes. The strong federalist incentives at the 
time-the need to knit together a federation of sovereigns and 
to secure approval of the Constitution being drafted-may ex-
plain the framers' failure to take state population into account 
in the amendment process. 
We do not know how many of the framers foresaw that the 
addition of new states and the internal migration of the national 
population could give the amending power to a minority of 
Americans. Alexander Hamilton, a delegate to the convention, 
foresaw the general problem, if not its application to the amend-
ing process, when, in Federalist No. 22, he wrote, "It may hap-
pen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people 
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of America. "10 Hamilton did not apparently raise this issue at 
the convention, and it was not debated. 
The disregard of popular will in article V also supports a re-
publican rationale. By calling for state assent rather than popu-
lar votes, article V requires that the people's representatives, not 
the people themselves, decide the fundamental questions raised 
by amendment proposals. A belief that the representatives 
would make wiser choices than the people themselves would not, 
of course, have been unique to the law of constitutional 
amendment. 
In the drafting of article V, however, the framers evidently re-
lied upon the federalist rationale more than the republican ra-
tionale. Article V provides two methods of ratifying amend-
ments: by state legislatures and by state conventions. The 
convention method bypasses the layer of representatives in an 
important way while preserving the federalist principle of disre-
garding population. State ratifying conventions are composed of 
delegates elected by the people. Although the delegates remain 
"representatives of the people," rather than "the people them-
selves," the election of delegates is a single issue election. The 
convention method allows the people to choose delegates for the 
single issue of ratification, instead of def erring to the legislators 
already sitting. The election results can therefore approach a 
popular referendum very closely. This focus of popular will rep-
resents the only significant difference between the legislative 
and convention methods of ratification. 
The convention method therefore provides a more democratic 
than republican method of ratifying amendments to the Consti-
tution. Both methods of ratifying amendments-by conventions 
and by legislatures-conform to the federalist principle because 
both provide that the assent of three-fourths of the states, re-
gardless of population, suffices to ratify an amendment. We may 
assume, then, that the framers did not rest the provisions of ar-
ticle V on principles of republican government so much as on 
principles of federalism. 11 We cannot assume, however, that they 
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton 
added the following footnote to the quoted statement: "New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the 
whole number of the States, but they do not contain one third of the people." Id. Hamil-
ton states that the least populous two-thirds of the states also comprised a minority of 
the national population, and that the addition of new states might aggravate the prob-
lem. Id. at 147. 
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing 
that the federal amending process was federalist in "requiring more than a majority, and 
particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens" (emphasis in origi-
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intended or foresaw all of the consequences of adhering to the 
federalist principle throughout radical changes in the size of the 
federation and the distribution of the population within it. 
B. Federalist and Republican Principles 
Let us say that a state legislature or convention "perfectly" 
represents its citizens only when a vote of ratification reflects 
unanimous popular assent to ratification and a vote against rati-
fication reflects unanimous popular dissent. Needless to say, rep-
resentation does not occur that perfectly, nor, under most re-
publican and even democratic theories, need it be perfect. In its 
extremity, however, perfect representation is a useful idea. If the 
conditions of perfect representation exist and a minority can 
still amend the Constitution, then we know that the problem 
does not stem from the betrayal of popular will by elected offi-
cials. And in fact this is so: The concentration of the national 
population over the last 200 years has become so severe that a 
minority can amend the Constitution even if each state. legisla-
ture represents its citizens "perfectly." 
Let us call the adoption of a constitutional amendment by 
states representing less than half the national population "mi-
nority amendment." It follows that minority amendments are 
adopted over the dissent (or indifference) of a majority. At the 
federal level, minority amendment can occur in only two ways: 
(1) the state legislatures or conventions represent their citizens 
very imperfectly, or (2) the least populous three-fourths of the 
states comprise less than half the national population. The first 
may be called the republican type of minority amendment, be-
cause it is made possible by the republican principle to let repre-
sentatives speak for the people even when representation may 
be imperfect. The second type of minority amendment may be 
called the federalist type, because it is made possible by the fed-
eralist principle to seek state assent without regard to 
population. 
Proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment may suspect that 
the amendment expired unratified because the legislatures in a 
few key states did not fairly represent their citizens. The fram-
ers designed the convention method of ratifying amendments to 
nal)). Madison added that the amending process has a "national" as opposed to a "feder-
alist" character because it settled for a supermajority rather than unanimity of the 
states. Id. 
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satisfy doubts of that kind, but this method has only been used 
once-for the twenty-first amendment (the repeal of prohibi-
tion). For other amendments, such as prohibition itself, doubts 
may linger on that the state legislators exceeded their popular 
mandate in voting to ratify. For defeated amendment proposals, 
such as the ERA, doubts may linger on that state legislators vio-
lated popular will in voting not to ratify. 
I mention the problem of imperfect representation here only 
to emphasize that the federalist type of minority amendment 
constitutes a very different problem from the republican type. 
The republican form of minority amendment represents a risk 
inherent in any republican form of government in which repre-
sentatives may speak for the people and may therefore speak 
inaccurately or against their interests. The framers clearly chose 
this risk, and it seems tolerable to most Americans.12 
The federalist form of minority amendment remains distinct 
and independent from the republican form. Neither provides the 
basis for the other. The federalist type may thus be remedied 
without challenging the republican form of government. Because 
even perfect representation in the state legislatures would not 
cure the problem of New California, the federalism of article V 
constitutes the more fundamental flaw: It now provides that 
three-fourths of the national population may be powerless to 
adopt amendments and that even a majority may be powerless 
to veto amendments. It does so either by insufficient foresight or 
by eighteenth century incentives to make a federation out of the 
several states. While federalism is far from obsolete, the grounds 
of many of its applications, including those of article V, were 
exhausted of urgency 200 years ago. But whether the problem 
arose from lack of foresight or federalist needs long since met, 
the problem may be remedied today without sacrificing the re-
publican form of government or any contemporary applications 
12. Selden Bacon provided the most spirited attack on the republican form of minor-
ity amendment. Bacon, How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the 
Constitution, 16 VA. L. REV. 771 (1930). In 1930, Bacon calculated that the number of 
state legislators necessary to adopt an amendment was 1300. Id. at 771-72. Finis J. Gar-
rett, writing one year before Bacon, could not get this number much below 4000. See 
Garrett, Amending the Federal Constitution, 7 TENN. L. REV. 286, 305-06 (1929). Speak-
ing 10 years earlier, Senator Ashurst of Arizona found the number to be even higher: 
"We set ourselves up as the leader among the nations in thought and as responsive to 
the people's will, and yet 4,500 men, if they saw fit, could Prussianize the Republic." 58 
CONG. REC. 5697 (1919), quoted in Martig, Amending the Constitution-Article Five: 
The Keystone of the Arch, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1253, 1282 (1937). 
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of the federalist principle outside the process of constitutional 
amendment.13 
C. Some Demographic History, 1790-1980 
When the Constitution was written, debated, and adopted, the 
requirement for three-fourths of the states invariably translated 
into a requirement for a significant supermajority of the popula-
tion. u Thirty years and nine new states after the adoption of the 
Constitution, the assent of three-fourths of the states could be 
gathered without mustering even a simple majority of the na-
tional population. Today, the twenty most populous American 
states form a "New California" containing three-fourths of the 
national population. Yet we still operate under an amendment 
clause written when three-fourths of the states represented an 
. absolute majority of the national population, and when the pop-
ulation disparity between the largest and smallest states was sig-
nificantly smaller. 
In the first census in 1790, three years after article V was writ-
ten, the Nation's most populous state (Virginia) contained 
nearly twelve times the population of the least populous state 
(Delaware). In the most recent census (1980), the most populous 
state (California) has nearly sixty times the population of the 
least populous state (Alaska). The disparity between the most 
and .least populous states has increased fivefold. In 1790, the five 
most populous states had slightly more than three times the 
population of the five least populous states; in 1980, this dispar-
ity has increased tenfold as the five most populous states con-
tain nearly thirty times the population of the five least populous 
states. 
In 1790, 31 % (four states) represented the fewest states 
needed to comprise half the national population, and 54 % 
(seven states) represented the fewest needed to comprise three-
fourths of the population. In 1980, these "ruling" sets have 
shrunk considerably: half the population now lives in 18 % of the 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. This claim is based on 1790 census data, published four years after the Annapolis 
Convention met to amend the Articles of Confederation, three years after the Constitu-
tional Convention was assembled in Philadelphia, and one year before the ratification of 
the new constitution became unanimous. Presumably these data were collected before 
1790. We do not know the demographic profile in the Nation prior to 1790 more pre-
cisely, nor, unfortunately, do we know exactly what the framers knew or assumed about 
it. But see supra Part ll(A). 
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states (nine states) and three-fourths of the nation lives in only 
40% of the states (twenty states). 
These figures show the contours of a major change in popula-
tion density. The national population has become much less 
evenly distributed among the states and much more concen-
trated in a few very large states. To count state votes regardless 
of population now greatly dilutes the voice of most Americans in 
the sovereign power of the American legal system. 
Perhaps it is well at this point to name names. The special 
40% minority that can adopt an amendment will overrule the 
60% squeezed into the most populous twelve states: California, 
New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Florida, Michi-
gan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and lndiana. 16 
The special 4 % minority that can veto an amendment, against 
the wishes of the 96 % concentrated in the most populous three-
fourths of the states, is composed of the citizens of Maine, Ha-
waii, Rhode Island, Idaho, New Hampshire, Nevada, Montana, 
South Dakota, North Dakota, Delaware, Vermont, Wyoming, 
and Alaska. 16 
How many Californians does it take to make one Alaskan? 
Answer: for power in the federal amending process, almost 60. 
The concentration of the population that has occurred over the 
past 200 years has injured the citizens of the most populous 
states the most severely. To measure the extent of the injury, we 
can set the voice of a citizen of California-the most populous 
state-at one unit, and ask how many units of voice are pos-
sessed by citizens of the least populous state, Alaska.17 
The following table18 summarizes the differentiation of 
amending power by state: 
15. These 12 states are listed in decreasing order by population, according to the 
1980 census. See appendix, table 4. 
16. These 13 states are listed in decreasing order by population, according to the 
1980 census. See appendix, table 4. 
17. Find the population of the most populous state (call it c for California). Set the 
voice of a citizen of that state at one unit (c divided by c). To measure the voice of 
citizens of another state (whose population s), divide c by s. 
Because we apportion senators by state and not by population, just as we apportion 
power in the federal amending process, this calculation also measures the relative voices 
of Americans in the Senate. Hence, it also measures the relative voices of Americans in 
those acts performed by the Senate without the concurrence of the House-in particular, 
the ratification of treaties and the confirmation of Supreme Court justices. U.S. CoNST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
18. An unabridged version of this table, with other data interposed for comparison, 
may be found in table 4 of the appendix. 
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RANK IN POP. (1980) STATE UNITS OF VOICE 
1 California 1.00 
5 Illinois 2.07 
10 North Carolina 4.00 
15 Missouri 4.82 
20 Washington 5.74 
25 Connecticut 7.63 
30 Oregon 9.00 
35 Nebraska 15.09 
40 Rhode Island 24.99 
45 South Dakota 34.34 
50 Alaska 59.24 
These figures reveal the results of an amendment clause that 
weighs state assent to the exclusion of popular assent. The fed-
eralist rationale of the clause, which values the voices of states 
more than the voices of their citizens, was strong in 1787 and 
may still be strong today. Yet, in 1787, the federalist principle 
was not antidemocratic in its effects. The states have always 
been of unequal size, giving the citizens of the smaller states 
greater voice in the amending process than citizens of the larger 
states. Courts have never applied the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple to article V .19 In 1787, however, and up to the census of 
1820, the differently weighted voices in the federation did not 
destroy majority rule. The addition of states of unequal size has 
enlarged the number of small states against the larger, and the 
internal migration of the population to cities has increased the 
disparity between the rural areas and the urban population cen-
ters. Hence, in 1820, and from 1850 onwards, the federalist prin-
ciple in the amending clause has allowed a few citizens in many 
states to overrule the many citizens in a few states. 
19. Courts have not interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require the one-person, 
one-vote principle for federal amendments because article V clearly establishes its own 
procedures in that regard. The (scanty) case law, however, is divided on the question of 
whether the fourteenth amendment requires that principle for state amending proce-
dures. The New Jersey amending process was once challenged for relying in part upon 
the State Senate, whose members were not elected under the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple. The State's amending process survived the challenge despite the conceded depar-
ture from the principle. Jackman v. Bodine, 78 N.J. Super. 414, 188 A.2d 642 (Ch. Div. 
1963). By contrast, the New Mexico Supreme Court struck down a section of the State's 
amending clause for violating the one-person, one-vote principle. State ex rel. Witt v. 
State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968). The offending section in effect 
treated the New Mexican counties as entities much like states in the federal Senate. See 
Comment, The New Mexico Constitutional Convention 1969, Constitutional Revi-
sion-Constitutional Amendment Process, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 422, 425-26 (1969). 
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As these demographic changes accumulated, the gradual and 
quantitative shifts of power became qualitative changes. The 
voice of a certain minority has grown by degrees, and the voice 
of a certain majority has dwindled. Two important thresholds 
were surpassed sometime between 1820 and 1850. First, a rural 
minority became able to adopt an amendment on its own, de-
stroying majority rule in the amendment process to this day. 
Second, the urban majority lost the power even to veto amend-
ments if it had to face the minimum sufficient rural minority 
(the least populous three-fourths of the states). The combined 
effect of these demographic changes has done more than merely 
give certain minorities power over certain majorities; it has given 
them virtual sovereignty-the federal amending power repre-
sents the supreme power in the American legal system, able to 
change any law and limit every power in the system. Hence, 
even those with the strongest loyalty to the federalist principle 
must question its continuing wisdom in a way that the framers 
did not have to question its original wisdom. Should our amend-
ing clause continue to put state assent ahead of popular assent 
now that strongly antidemocratic results are possible? 
These demographic changes have produced two anti-
democratic effects, not foreseen 200 years ago, that need reme-
dies today. The first is the loss of majority rule in the amending 
process. The remedy may, but need not, incorporate the one-
person, one-vote principle. The second is the discriminatory im-
pact on racial minorities and the poor. Americans have not lost 
their voices in the amending process in equal degrees. Neither 
the winners nor the losers in this shift of power represent a 
cross-section of Americans. The citizens of the sparsely popu-
lated states have gained voice, while those in the heavily popu-
lated states have lost. The groups concentrated in the heavily 
populated states who have lost the most amending power in-
clude blacks, hispanics, members of labor unions, recipients of 
AFDC, and persons with income below the poverty level. 
Hence, the minority that has been given the federal amending 
power at the expense of the majority is not one of the "discrete 
and insular" minorities that we normally want to protect from 
majoritarian oppression.20 On the contrary, the minority that 
has gained power was already in power in the legislatures of the 
sparsely populated states, and the majority that has lost power 
includes disproportionate fractions of the Nation's discrete and 
20. The term "discrete and insular minorities" originated in Justice Stone's famous 
fourth footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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insular minorities, disadvantaged, and powerless. The winning 
minority may not be wealthy or well-educated, but it is far from 
deserving special constitutional solicitude. The shrinking minor-
ity· that can amend, then, and the shrinking superminority that 
can veto, entrench an already powerful class and aggravate the 
estrangement from power of other minorities. 
Ill. To WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE POSSIBLE DANGERS BECOME 
ACTUAL? 
The data show so far only a mathematical possibility that a 
minority of Americans may adopt a constitutional amendment 
and that a very tiny minority may veto one by refusing to ratify 
it. One may well ask whether either of these antidemocratic sce-
narios has occurred. One may ask about more subtle harms be-
yond these dramatic possibilities, such as the loss of majority 
rule and the rejection of the one-person, one-vote principle. Are 
there any existing harms to which we may point, or are we left 
to reckon tlie danger of a mathematical possibility? Throughout 
this section I will focus on the possibilities of federalist, not re-
publican, minority amendment. 
The first danger is that of minority amendment itself. So far 
no amendment has been adopted by states representing less 
than half the national population. The eighteenth amendment 
(prohibition) presented the closest case. At the time of its ratifi-
cation in 1919, a constitutional amendment required thirty-six 
states for adoption; the first thirty-six states to ratify the eight-
eenth amendment comprised 62.51 % of the national popula-
tion.21 Forty-five states, however, comprising 90.48% of the na-
tional population, eventually ratified the eighteenth 
amendment.22 The twenty-fifth amendment (presidential disa-
bility and succession) presented the next closest case. By 1967, 
when this amendment was ratified, the nation had grown to its 
present size. Hence, an amendment required thirty-eight states 
for ratification (three-fourths of fifty, rounded upwards); the 
first thirty-eight states to ratify the twenty-fifth amendment 
comprised 70.33 % of the national population. 23 The eighteenth 
21. This figure uses 1920 census data; the figure is 62.52% using 1910 census data. 
See appendix, table 2. 
22. This figure also uses 1920 census data; the figure is 80.78% using 1910 census 
data. See appendix, table 2. 
23. This figure uses 1960 census data; the figure is 70.13% using 1970 census data. 
Forty-seven states, comprising 96.10% of the national population (using 1960 data, or 
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and twenty-fifth amendments marked the only amendments 
whose "first three-fourths" comprised less than 75% of the pop-
ulation. The average for all amendments adopted after the Bill 
of Rights is 79.56% (first three-fourths) or 89.12% (all states 
eventually ratifying). 
The federalist type of minority amendment has not occurred. 
Every adopted amendment has been ratified by states contain-
ing more than half of the national population, and most have 
been ratified by supermajorities exceeding 75% of the national 
population. Whether we look at the "first three-fourths" of the 
states to ratify, or especially if we look at all the states eventu-
ally ratifying, we must conclude that the adopted amendments 
have been very popular with the people or at least with their 
representatives. 
Let us call the veto of an amendment by states representing 
less than 25% of the national population a "superminority 
veto." The ,same demographic conditions that make minority 
amendment possible make superminority veto possible. One-
fourth of the states plus one may always veto an amendment by 
refusing to ratify it. When a majority of the national population 
is concentrated in fewer than one-fourth of the states, then the 
remaining three-fourths may adopt an amendment against the 
wishes of a majority of the people (federalist minority amend-
ment), and the least populous one-fourth may veto an amend-
ment against the wishes of very large supermajorities of the na-
tional population (federalist superminority veto). 
Although we know that federalist minority amendment has 
not occurred for any ratified amendment, it is more difficult to 
say whether federalist superminority veto has occurred for any 
defeated amendment. We eliminate at the start the amendment 
proposals defeated in Congress and never sent to the states. 
Only six proposals have passed both houses of Congress and 
failed to attain the assent of three-fourths of the states.2• When 
96.159,, using 1970 data), eventually ratified the twenty-fifth amendment, See appendix, 
table 2. 
24. The six proposals approved by Congress but defeated by the states were as fol-
lows: (1) a scheme to apportion the members of the House (submitted with the Bill of 
Rights in 1789); (2) a rule to bar congressional salary increases from taking effect until 
after the next election of representatives (submitted with the Bill of Rights in 1789); (3) 
a rule to strip U.S. citizenship from any citizen accepting a title, present, or office from a 
foreign power without the consent of Congress (1810); (4) the so-called Corwin amend-
ment, which would have barred future amendments authorizing Congress to abolish the 
"domestic institutions" of any state, including slavery (1861); (5) the so-called Child La-
bor Amendment, which would have given Congress authority to regulate the labor of 
those under 18 years of age (1924); and (6) the Equal Rights Amendment, which would 
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a defeated proposal contained no fixed expiration date-which 
was the case for all proposals prior to the eighteenth amend-
ment-then it is impossible to say which states "vetoed" them 
unless nearly every state voted one way or another. Otherwise, 
arguably, they are still pending, awaiting the requisite votes of 
ratification. 211 
Despite these difficulties, it seems clear that none of the six 
proposals passed by Congress and rejected by the states was de-
feated by a superminority veto. The proposals not known to 
have enough rejecters to escape superminority veto are known to 
have too few ratifiers.26 Even if any of the latter proposals are 
"still pending," their failure to become law so far is not the work 
of superminority veto. 
We do have good data in the case of the ERA.27 The states 
that never ratified the ERA comprised either 29.87% or 27.95% 
of the national population, depending upon whether we use 1980 
or 1970 data. If we count rescissions of ratification as effective, 
these figures are even higher. 
These figures for the ERA clearly reveal that the federalist 
type of minority amendment, or veto in this case, did not cause 
the amendment's def eat: the states refusing to ratify the ERA 
contained over one-fourth of the Nation's population. Yet the 
republican type of minority amendment or veto may well have 
undermined the ERA's success.28 We do not know precisely how 
many citizens across the country would have voted for the ERA 
in a popular referendum. If these citizens ever exceeded 75% of 
the national population, then only imperfect representation can 
account for the demise of the ERA. 29 The set of ratifying states 
could have grown, however, to contain 75% of Americans, with-
out reaching the threshold of thirty-eight states needed to ratify 
have prohibited discrimination by the state and federal governments on account of sex 
(1972). 
25. When amendment proposals contain no expiration date, the states may consider 
them for a "reasonable" time. Congress determines how long a period is reasonable. Dil-
lon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
26. The two defeated proposals submitted with the original Bill of Rights are known 
to have had more than enough rejecters; the other four are known to have had too few 
ratifiers. On the first two, see B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 187, 190-91 (1977). On the ERA, see infra text accom-
panying notes 27-29. 
27. In 1972, Congress passed the ERA and sent it to the states. The ERA expired 
unratified in 1982 after a three-year extension of the original seven-year period. 
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
29. If we count rescissi.ons as ineffective, then the states that ratified the ERA com-
prised 70.13% or 72.05% of the national population, depending upon whether we use 
1980 or 1970 census data. 
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the amendment. For example, as the most populous of the 
nonratifying states, Illinois could have cast a ratifying vote and 
easily put the percentage of citizens in ratifying states over 75% 
without meeting the three-fourths requirement for state votes. If 
this had happened, then the federalist type of superminority 
veto would have appeared in addition to any possible republican 
superminority veto or very imperfect representation. 
If one- is prone to 'fear that mathematically possible dangers 
may become actual, then one has more to fear from the republi-
can type of minority amendment than from the federalist type. 
The number of members of Congress and state legislatures 
needed to propose and ratify a federal amendment is exceed-
ingly small as a percentage of the national population. Suppose 
it takes 2000 today; that is less than one-thousandth of one per-
cent of the national population. In principle this group could 
adopt or prevent amendments against the will of every other sin-
gle American. Past critics of the fairness of article V have fo-
cussed on this potential, 30 which in effect is an indictment of 
representative forms of democracy. Whether or not one is 
tempted to join this critique, one should note that the republi-
can type of abuse is separate from the federalist type, not the 
basis for it. Perfect representation in state legislatures would 
leave the potential for federalist minority amendment intact. 
How realistic is it to fear the federalist type of minority 
amendment? The census data of the last 200 years prove that 
minority amendment and superminority veto are living opportu-
nities for the appropriate populations to seize. But should we 
fear that this will happen, or simply observe that it is possible? 
Although states representing a minority of the national popu-
lation have not yet adopted any amendment, the antidemocratic 
possibilities of minority amendments and vetoes are not merely 
speculative. Rule by a minority, and veto by an extraordinary 
minority, are mathematically possible today, and have been for 
130 continuous years. In this they resemble the dangers of run-
away legislatures, conventions, and electoral colleges; grossly im-
perfect representation is mathematically possible and has been 
for our entire history under the Constitution. There are many 
informal political checks that prevent legislators from defying 
popular will in large numbers on important issues, especially 
when that popular will is unified, intense, and discernible. Al-
though in principle these checks may fail, their gross failure is 
rarely a realistic possibility. Hence, critics who focus on the dan-
30. See Bacon, supra note 12, at 771-72; Garrett, supra note 12, at 304-06. 
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ger of mass legislative betrayal of popular will, or the republican 
type of minority amendment, are easily cast as cranks, fright-
ened of a bare possibility and willing to sacrifice republican de-
mocracy to meet it. 
Without joining these suspicions, or answering them, I simply 
observe that the possibility of the federalist type of minority 
amendment and veto vastly differs from the possibility of imper-
fect representation. Not only do the two types of abuse rep-
resent independent dangers, they also present actual (as op-
posed to potential) harms in different ways and degrees. The 
two dangers have also been carried from mere mathematical pos-
sibilities to actual harms in different degrees. The concentrating 
American population has already placed the federal amending 
power in the hands of a shifting and shrinking minority. That 
minority is not subject to the formal and informal checks that 
restrain state legislators-preeminently the fear of defeat, hope 
of re-election, hope of future cooperation from other legislators, 
and a sense of professionalism. 
Another difference between the republican and federalist dan-
gers, more important to lawyers than to other citizens, is that 
the framers evidently foresaw and intentionally left us at the 
risk of the former, but almost certainly did not even foresee the 
latter. Hence, even if the two dangers were equally likely to ma-
terialize, action to prevent the federalist danger would be far 
more consonant with our constitutional design than action to 
prevent the possibility of imperfect representation. 
For the republican type of minority amendment to succeed, 
representation must be so imperfect that most citizens would 
judge it unfair. In contrast, with the federalist type of minority 
amendment, the minority that holds the power to overrule the 
majority does not even putatively represent the majority. 
Neither a sense of fairness and obligation nor a sense of account-
ability, political prudence, or Machiavellian calculation present 
a deterrent to abuse here. When we recall that the federalist 
type of minority amendment and veto may exist even under the 
assumption of perfect representation in each state legislature, 
then we see very clearly that the potential for antidemocratic 
results does not depend upon whether the maldistributed 
amending power will be abused or used unfairly, but whether it 
will be used at all by certain groups. 
In short, there are two reasons why the possibility of the fed-
eralist type of minority amendment and veto is already an ac-
tual harm different from the possibility of imperfect representa-
tion. First, the power of minority amendment and veto is 
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already vested in the hands that can use it, and its use does not 
depend upon ill-will, bad faith, usurpation, antidemocratic senti-
ments, or the failure of informal but reliable checks. Further-
more, its use is entirely compatible with the strict conditions of 
perfect representation. Although public opinion, the electoral 
process, and some sense of duty in many representatives restrain 
republican abuses, nothing comparable exists to restrict the fed-
eralist abuse. Not only can the smaller states outvote the bulk of 
the population without misrepresenting their own citizens, but 
they may often find it in their own interests to do so. 31 
Second, and most importantly, the federalist danger has mate-
rialized in different degrees already. First, although no amend-
ment has been adopted by states comprising less than one-half 
of the national population, states comprising less than three-
fourths of the national population have adopted two amend-
ments. Second, the departure from the one-person, one-vote 
principle has never been a mere mathematical possibility. The 
principle has been violated in the ratification of every amend-
ment in American history. Moreover, the nonuniform dilution of 
voice implied by the violation of the one-person, one-vote princi-
ple is already actual. For more than a century, the citizens of the 
heavily populated states have had less weight in the amendment 
process than other Americans. This violation of the one-person, 
one-vote principle disproportionately weakens the voice of city 
dwellers, racial minorities, labor union members, and the poor. 
Finally, we have long since lost supermajority rule, and even ma-
jority rule, in the federal amending process. 
Article V contains the potential for federalist and republican 
violations of popular will. The republican type may have oc-
curred often but in small degrees compatible with the constitu-
tional design intended by the framers and, to a large extent, ac-
cepted by the people of the United States. The federalist type, 
however, has already generated some antidemocratic effects. Its 
potential to create more need not be suffered as the price of rep-
resentative democracy or the intent of the framers. Those of us 
who would like a remedy do not confuse the federalist danger 
with legislative betrayal of popular will and do not fear a bare 
mathematical possibility. We regret the existing loss of majority 
rule in the amending process, and the violation of the one-per-
son, one-vote principle, and we fear the chance that a supermi-
nority veto may block an amendment favored by a national 
supermajority, and the chance that an honest minority of Ameri-
31. See infra Part IV. 
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cans accidentally clustered in sparsely populated states will use 
the power they have inherited to amend the Constitution against 
the will of a national majority. 
Methodological Demurrers 
Two methodological problems complicate the task of inter-
preting the data in the appendix to determine whether potential 
harms are actual harms. First, the data in table 1 only show a 
potential for minority amendment under certain assumptions. 
The tidiest, but least plausible, assumption is that state legisla-
tures (or state conventions) represent their citizens perfectly. If 
the least populous three-fourths of the states adopted an 
amendment, then we would not know, without more, whether a 
minority or a majority of Americans favored the amendment. 
The adopting states would contain a minority of Americans but, 
of course, the amendment could be favored by citizens in dis-
senting states and disfavored by citizens in assenting states. 
Adoption by the least populous three-fourths of the states 
would constitute "minority amendment" if each state legislature 
perfectly represented its citizens, and under a few other more 
realistic assumptions. Representation, of course, does not occur 
perfectly. Assenting states contain dissenters and dissenting 
states contain assenters. I need not (and do ·not) argue that, 
across the Nation, these unrepresented preferences cancel each 
other out, as Livingston does. 32 For if the unrepresented dissent-
ers vastly outnumbered the unrepresented assenters, then the 
potential for minority amendment would be stronger than ever. 
The ratifying state legislatures could represent small popula-
tions to begin with, and disregard local majority sentiment 
against an amendment. Moreover, the unrepresented assenting 
citizens could outnumber the unrepresented dissenters nation-
wide without eliminating the potential for minority amendment. 
If the least populous three-fourths of the states ratified an 
amendment, then it would be mathematically possible for the 
outvoted large dissenting states to have more unrepresented as-
senters than the victorious small states have unrepresented 
dissenters. 
Second, accuracy of census data raises an additional method-
ological problem. By comparing the data from different census 
decades, I am not assuming that each census is equally reliable. I 
32. W. LIVINGSTON, supra note 6, at 235 n.4. 
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am assuming, however, that each is roughly as reliable for its 
large states as for its small states. 
IV. THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE 
AMENDMENTS 
Courts have never applied the one-person, one-vote principle 
to the federal amendment process. Two centuries of defiance of 
that principle under article V have allowed innocent shifts in the 
national population to weaken the voice of citizens in the heavily 
populated states. A citizen of New York or California has far less 
weight in the amending process than a citizen of Wyoming or 
Alaska. Consequently, as a general rule, the federalist type of 
minority amendment enhances the chances of amendments fa-
vored by the citizens of lightly populated states, and diminishes 
the chances of amendments favored by citizens of heavily popu-
lated states. 
On many issues, citizens of lightly and heavily populated 
states have the same interests, or have no competing interests. 
Yet, on other issues, their interests divide them. Neither group 
represents a national consensus on all important issues of public 
policy. Of the groups that have lost power in the amending pro-
cess, some have lost amending power overall, some have lost it 
less, and others more, than a fictitious "average American," and, 
paradoxically, some still retain control in the states that have 
gained power. Although difficult, it is possible to pick among the 
losing constituencies and· to determine which groups have suf-
fered a disproportionate loss of voice. 
Two kinds of groups have lost voice in the amending process 
because of the concentration of the population. To articulate 
this distinction more clearly, let us call the states that have lost 
voice in the amending process the "losing states" and the rest 
the "winning states." The winners are the least populous three-
fourths of the states. The losers are all the others-the most 
populous one-fourth. Now let us posit two groups of Americans, 
each having members in both the winning and losing states: the 
"Evens" and the "Unevens." Suppose the Evens and Unevens 
have exactly the same number of members nationwide. The 
Evens dwell in the winning and losing states in the same propor-
tion as Americans in general. If the losing states contain 60 % of 
Americans, then they contain 60 % of the Evens as well. The 
ll,nevens have concentrated in the losing states. If the losing 
states contain 60 %- of Americans and Evens, they might contain 
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70% or 80% of the Unevens. For example, women obviously re-
. present a group like the Evens and big-city dwellers form a 
group like the Unevens. 
The Evens and Unevens have both become net losers of voice 
in the amending process. Although each loses, as a class, because 
most of its members dwell in the losing states, the Unevens lose 
out of proportion to their numbers because a greater percentage 
lose voice than do Americans in general. The Evens, however, do 
not lose voice out of proportion to their numbers because the 
same percentage of Evens gain and lose voice as do Americans in 
general. Collectively, each group ends up a loser; distributively, a 
greater number and, therefore, a greater percentage of Unevens 
lose voice. As national constituencies, the Unevens as a class will 
have lost power relative to the Evens. Without the differential 
harm suffered by groups like the Unevens, we could speak only 
of detrimental impact or loss of voice. But because the detri-
ment falls disproportionately on different groups, we may speak 
of discriminatory impact. 
Now that we possess the distinction between the Evens and 
the Unevens, we observe that almost all Americans have 
emerged as losers of voice in the amending process, but that not 
all are uneven losers. Whites and blacks, men and women, rich 
and poor, employed and unemployed, as classes, have all lost 
voice in the amending process. Indeed, as a class, Americans 
have (evenly) lost voice in the amending process because more 
Americans live in the losing states than in the winning states. 
Table 3 of the appendix allows us to determine that the uneven 
losers include blacks, hispanics, members of labor unions, recipi-
ents of AFDC, and persons with income below the poverty line. 33 
The worsening federalist danger possible under article V hin-
ders the adoption of those amendments favored by the uneven 
losers. The resubmitted ERA and the proposal to give the Dis-
trict of Columbia most of the political rights of a state represent 
two such amendments. Any proposal (such as I will describe in 
Part V) to change the amendment process to correct this prob-
lem may present a third amendment of this type. 
By contrast, citizens of the lightly populated states are dispro-
portionately rural, western, white, and middle class (or nonindi-
gent and nonunionist). Amendments favored by these constitu-
encies are more likely to be adopted as the concentration of the 
33. For the three mathematical tests used to indicate discriminatory impact, see the 
introduction to table 3 in the appendix. The table itself gives the data on which the tests 
are pased. 
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population increases or as the federalist danger continues and 
worsens. Possible amendments of this type include proposals to 
require a balanced federal budget, to permit prayer in public 
schools, and to ban most abortions. 
By "enhancing" and "diminishing" the chances of amend-
ments, I mean the chances of an amendment's adoption today as 
compared to the chances of the same amendments (1) under a 
democratic rather than federalist procedure, and (2) under the 
demographic patterns of the past, rather than the present. 
Hence, if we only consider the effects of the increasing concen-
tration of the population, then a resubmitted ERA is less likely 
to be adopted under the present amending procedure than 
under a democratic procedure, and less likely to be adopted to-
day than in the past. Similarly, the proposal to ban most abor-
tions is more likely to be adopted under the present methods 
than under democratic methods, and more likely to be adopted 
today than in the past. 
Throughout American history, the density of the population 
in the rural areas has tended to decrease and the population of 
the urban and industrial areas has tended to increase. Under ar-
ticle V, that trend simply adds weight to the preferences of the 
rural citizens who stay in the country and subtracts weight from 
the preferences of city dwellers, further intensifying the discrim-
inatory impact on the racial minorities and others unevenly con-
centrated in the large urban states. The trend may, however, be 
reversing. The 1980 census shows a decrease of population in the 
heavily populated states and an increase in certain lightly popu-
lated states, thus documenting the migration from the cities to 
the "sunbelt." Undoubtedly, such reverse shifts of population 
enhance the democracy of the present amending procedure but, 
so far, can only be considered one step toward democracy after 
130 years of backward steps. 
V. REMEDIES 
Not all serious risks of abuse and even actual harms should be 
remedied, arguably, if they are inseparable from a constitutional 
design with overriding virtues. That is not the case here. The 
federalist type of minority amendment and veto represents an 
anomaly under the Constitution, not an inevitable or desirable 
byproduct of the framers' designs. Tolerating its risks is not a 
part of ordinary political trust of representatives or loyalty to 
the Constitution. The federalist type of minority amendment 
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should be feared as a present and inadvertent vesting of su-
preme power in a shrinking and unrepresentative minority of 
Americans that has no reason to restrain itself, and some reason 
to use, its gift of power. For us, unlike the framers, the problem 
is not to foresee and avoid a danger, but to recognize and rem-
edy an abuse that has already crept up on us. 
How can the dangers latent in article V be remedied? The re-
publican type of abuse could be remedied by eliminating the 
layer of representatives, or by specially electing representatives 
for the ratification vote and binding them to the publicly an-
nounced positions on which they campaigned. A popular refer-
endum and the present convention method of ratification (modi-
fied to bind delegates to campaign positions) would each cure 
the republican type of abuse. The latter would eliminate the re-
publican danger while preserving the federalist principle and its 
modern dangers. 
The federalist type of abuse could be remedied only by taking 
population into account in the ratification process. This remedy 
would require repeal of the present methods of ratification, in-
cluding the convention method. A popular referendum that 
transcended state boundaries, and a plan to weigh state votes by 
population, would each provide a remedy to the federalist type 
of abuse. Weighing state votes by population would eliminate 
the federalist danger but would preserve the republican princi-
ple and its dangers. Only a referendum would eliminate the fed-
eralist and republican dangers at once. 
Americans should realize that if the past population shifts 
cannot be reversed, then a remedy must be sought in an amend-
ment to article V.3"' Naturally, any new method of amendment 
would have to be adopted under the present method, just as 
only whites could vote to give blacks the right to vote under the 
fifteenth amendment and only men could vote to give women 
the right to vote under the nineteenth amendment. 36 
34. Alf Ross has argued that no constitutional amending clause can be used to amend 
itself. Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1 (1969). 
Ross finds a logical impossibility in self-amendment, but makes no case at all that logical 
impossibilities must also be legal impossibilities. The amending clause in the federal 
Constitution has never been used to amend itself (depending on what one counts as 
amendment), hut the amending clauses in 48 state constitutions have done so without 
challenge. These data, legal arguments against Ross, and variations on the theme of self-
amendment are collected in P. SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF 
LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (forthcoming). 
35. The proponents of at least one proposed amendment to article V tried to boot-
strap the amendment into effect by asking that it be adopted in the way it proposed for 
future amendments. In 1869, Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky proposed to allow ratifi-
cation by popular referendum and expressly included language allowing his very proposal 
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The referendum method of ratification presents a compelling 
solution to the problem. Without undue complexity, and in one 
stroke, it would eliminate both the federalist and republican 
risks to democratic process. A referendum would bypass repre-
sentatives who might depart from popular will and surpass state 
boundaries that dilute the strength of most citizens' voices. 
A few words on the referendum method of ratification may set 
the stage for informed debate. First, to prevent the republican 
and federalist dangers, the referendum method must become the 
exclusive, not supplementary, method of ratification. Or, at 
least, the present legislative and convention methods must be 
repealed. As long as the legislative method of ratification off e:rs 
another option, both types of abuse will remain possible, and, as 
long as the convention method continues, the federalist type of 
abuse will remain possible. 
Second, proposals to make a referendum exclusive are not new 
and have historically been offered by those wishing to make 
amendment even more difficult than it already is. 36 Whether a 
referendum would make amendment more difficult is an empiri-
cal question on which the experience of several states will be rel-
evant. Whether the amending process should be made easier or 
more difficult is a political question that should be answered 
anew by each generation. We should realize that even by leaving 
article V unchanged, we consent to changes, wrought by expan-
sion and migration, that make amendment more difficult for cer-
tain majorities and less difficult for certain minorities. 
If, in our best judgment, we conclude that an ordinary referen-
dum would increase the difficulty of amendment, and that we do 
not want to increase that difficulty, we could still use a modified 
referendum. For example, a referendum could require (say) 67 % 
assent of those eligible to vote or 75% assent of those actually 
voting. Such a disjunctive requirement would lower the hurdle 
to amendment without diminishing minority rights. 
Third, a properly designed referendum need not threaten the 
benefits of the federalist principle that still exist in the late 
twentieth century. Any amendment to article V that merely 
made a referendum exclusive would not affect federalism in the 
to be ratified by referendum. Four years later Representative Charles Howell Porter of 
Virginia proposed to permit ratification by referendum, but eliminated Davis' paradox 
and submitted his proposal for adoption under existing methods. H. AMES, The Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During the First Century of its 
History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 
1896 293, 294 (1897). 
36. See L. ORFIELD. THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 217 (1942). 
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form of local control and experimentation. To prevent regional 
imbalance or the rule of the Nation by New York, the Midwest-
ern industrial states, Texas, and California, a referendum could 
call for (say) 75% assent nationwide and 51 % in each of three-
fourths of the states. Such a double or conjunctive requirement 
would not replicate the federalist type of minority amendment. 
Rather, it would give the numerous but thinly populated states a 
veto, but neither a superminority veto nor the power to impose 
an amendment on the majority. 
A referendum thus represents one way, but not the only way, 
to restore democracy to the amending process. A supermajority 
of 75% of the national population could almost always have its 
way under such a democratic scheme. Under the present federal-
ist and republican scheme, this supermajority could only have 
its way if it is both (1) widely distributed among the states and 
(2) fairly represented in the state legislatures. The second condi-
tion changes unpredictably, and we tolerate a great deal of im-
perfect representation in the name of republicanism. The first 
condition, however, does not exist and is not likely to exist in 
the near future. Moreover, the dilution of popular sovereignty 
that results is not justified by eighteenth century federalist prin-
ciples or by twentieth century notions of democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
The addition of states of unequal size to the Union, and the 
migration of the population into urban areas, has in effect 
amended article V of the Constitution. As a result of these de-
mographic changes, the amending process under article V now 
permits a minority of the population (about 40%) to adopt 
amendments, and a tiny minority (about 4%) to veto amend-
ments. Thus, a sufficient number of sparsely populated states 
can override the intense preference of up to 96 % of American 
citizens. The principle that makes this possible is not protection 
of minorities but federalism. It is not the federalism of local con-
trol and experimentation, but the federalism of state sovereignty 
and state ingratiation needed to get the original Constitution 
adopted. Yet by treating all states equally in the amending pro-
cess, article V now treats their citizens unequally. It allows the 
numerous but thinly populated states to outvote large 
supermajorities of the population. This result could not have oc-
curred in the generation of the framers. Such a result became 
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possible only as the number of states increased and as the popu-
lation became concentrated in a few large states. 
Delegates to the constitutional convention almost certainly 
did not foresee or intend the antidemocratic effects of the pres-
ent amendment process, although Alexander Hamilton envi-
sioned the general possibility. The delegates did not raise the 
issue at the convention, even though the result primarily injures 
the larger -states, in which most of the framers resided. The pre-
sent amendment process subverts the ideals of popular sover-
eignty, supermajority rule, and even majority rule. The framers 
provided for the addition of new states, but not for the day 
when such additions, and state rule itself at the level of federal 
amendments, would injure the rights and even compromise the 
sovereignty of the people. 
Even if the federalist type of minority amendment was fore-
seen by the framers and justified by the strong· desire to knit 
together a federation, or to adopt the Constitution, those partic-
ular federalist designs are achieved today. The states have 
formed a federation that is in no danger of dissolving if article V 
abandons its federalist principle for a democratic one. To main-
tain the federalism that holds the Nation together, then, we 
need not maintain the federalist principle of article V that pe-
nalizes migration into population centers, lessens the voice of ur-
ban and industrial American communities, blacks, hispanics, la-
bor unionists, women heads of household, and the poor, and · 
turns over the supreme power in the American legal system to a 
minority of the national population. 
We can distinguish the fear of this danger of minority amend-
ment from the fear that our representatives will betray us once 
elected. That republican possibility is separable from the feder-
alist possibility; the former has existed since the Nation was 
founded as a republic, and was clearly intended by the framers 
as part of the risk of founding a republic. The federalist danger 
exists even under the quixotic conditions of perfect representa-
tion. The framers did not intend it, and it was not provided by 
the Constitution until innocent additions of new states and in-
ternal migrations exposed an unforeseen weakness in the 
amending process. 
The minority favored by the anomaly in article V is not "dis-
crete and insular" in our society and not in need of protection, 
for it already holds power in the lightly populated states. In fact, 
the minority protected by this anomaly already dominates the 
legislatures of the lightly populated states. The amending 
power-the supreme power in our legal system-should not be 
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left in the hands of an absolute and shrinking minority, espe-
cially one that is neither a fair cross-section of the American 
public nor elected to represent that public in its own way. 
The potential for abuse, either by permitting basic change by 
a minority or by permitting veto by a scintilla of the population, 
does not present an intermittent, remote, or new danger. It first 
became possible thirty years after the Constitution was adopted, 
and has continued for the past 130 years. Over this long history, 
the minority that can adopt amendments and the sliver that can 
veto amendments have both shrunk; simultaneously, of course, 
the supermajority that can be thwarted has grown. Finally, this 
danger is far from speculative. Here we have a rare case in which 
an argument against antidemocratic abuse can be documented 
statistically. I invite the reader to attend to the figures in the 
appendix. They tell a story that should arouse the concern of all 
Americans, and stimulate reflection on the merits of alternative 
remedies. 
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APPENDIX: Supporting Data 
Table 1: The Possibility of Federalist Minority Amendment: 
Decade by Decade 
The following table contains population data from each census 
from the first in 1790 to the most recent in 1980. For each cen-
sus year, I have listed the states in descending order by popula-
tion size and shortened the names of the states to the current 
two-letter postal abbreviations. The population for each state is 
in thousands, rounded off to the nearest thousand. When two or 
more states had the same rounded population in the same year, 
I have listed them in alphabetical order by their full names. 
For each census year, I have included only those states that 
were eligible to vote on co:.1stitutional amendments as of the be-
ginning of that census year, although the Census Bureau often 
collected population figures for territories and dependencies in-
eligible to vote. This arrangement should help to highlight the 
crucial threshold of three-fourths of the states needed to amend; 
the list shown for each decade contains the total number of 
states from which the three-fourths would be calculated. The list 
does not include the District of Columbia because it has never 
been eligible to ratify amendments. A state becomes eligible tp 
vote on amendments upon formal admission to the Union; the 
number of states needed for ratification increases at the same 
time. 
At the top of each list, before the list of states begins, I have 
indicated the number of states then eligible to ratify amend-
ments, and the number of states needed to meet the three-
fourths requirement. 
At the bottom of each list I have indicated the "total" popula-
tion for that census year. This total is merely the sum of the 
state figures listed above it; it does not include the citizens of 
the District of Columbia, the citizens of the territories, or the 
Americans residing abroad. Curiously, although more complete 
totals are available for each census year, no totals are available 
that are published for each census year and calculated on the 
same basis for each census year. 
The letter "M" stands for the "most" populous three-fourths 
of the states, and "L" for. the "least" populous three-fourths of 
the states. The states comprising M and L are indicated by signs 
to the right of the respective threshold states in the lists them-
selves. I have calculated and noted the populations represented 
by M and L at the bottom of each list. I also compared these 
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populations with the "total" for each list, and produced a per-
centage that indicates what portion M and L represent of the 
"total" population. Note that if uniform, complete totals were 
available, L and M would comprise even smaller percentages of 
the national population than are shown here. Hence, when my 
data show L as less than 50 % population, better data would 
only show it even smaller. We cannot determine whether the 
four times that L exceeds 50% would actually dip below 50% 
with better data. 
At the bottom of each list, I have also indicated which of the 
twenty-six adopted, and six defeated, amendments were pro-
posed and ratified in the decade beginning with that census. The 
"six defeated" amendments are those that were proposed by 
Congress with the requisite two-thirds votes of each house, but 
did not muster the requisite ratifying votes from three-fourths 
of the states. Of course, there have been thousands of proposals 
defeated at the congressional stage. I have given the dates of 
proposal and ratification for each adopted amendment, and the 
dates of proposal for the six defeated amendments. The date of 
proposal is the date the amendment was approved by Congress 
and sent to the states. The date of ratification· is the day the 
Secretary of State or Administrator of General Services pro-
claimed the validity of the amendment. The defeated amend-
ments, of course, have determinate dates of proposal, but they 
do not always have determinate dates of defeat. Only recently, 
since the eighteenth amendment, have we put a deadline for rat-
ification into the texts of proposed amendments themselves. If 
the amendment contains no deadline, the rule seems to be that 
ratifications may continue for a "reasonable" time, when Con-
gress determines that reasonableness. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921). 
At the bottom of each list, I have also indicated which states 
were admitted to the Union in the decade beginning that year. 
By including these sub-lists on amendments and state admis-
sions, I hope the reader will be able-without cross-checking 
from other tables-to determine which year's census data are 
most appropriate for calculating majority or minority support 
for a given amendment. Table 2 summarizes the data as it per-
tains to this question. 
A summary of the data precedes the table. More complete 
summaries appear in the main text. 
I have taken or derived all data from census years prior to 
1980 from 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES 
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TO 1970 (1975). Data from the 1980 census are taken or derived 
from the BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (101st ed. 1981). Fi-
nally, I have taken dates of the proposals and ratifications of 
amendments from the United States Constitution (proposals 
and ratifications), United States Code (1982). 
Summary of Table 1 
The least populous three-fourths of the states comprised less 
than half of the total national population in sixteen of the 
twenty census years. The four exceptions were 1790, 1800, 1810, 
and 1840. With a few dips and rises, the value of L (as a per-
centage) decreases steadily with time. The potential for a minor-
ity to amend the Constitution by mustering the consent of 
three-fourths of the states first appeared in 1820, and has not 
disappeared since 1850. 
1790 L = 56.74% 1890 L = 48.08% 
1800 L = 50.86% 1900 L = 43.68% 
1810 L = 52.29% 1910 L = 46.95% 
1820 L = 49.60% 1920 L = 43.88% 
1830 L = 46.84% 1930 L = 41.80% 
1840 L = 50.19% 1940 L = 41.97% 
1850 L = 49.26% 1950 L = 41.21% 
1860 L = 48.40% 1960 L = 40.43% 
1870 L = 46.09% 1970 L = 39.87% 
1880 L = 49.64% 1980 L = 41.12% 
The least populous 25 % + 1 of the states represents the 
smallest percentage of the national population that can veto an 
amendment. This can be calculated by subtracting the popula-
tion of the most populous three-fourths of the states from the 
national total and then adding the population of the next most 
populous state; the ratio of the resulting number to the total na-
tional population at the time is the desired figure. For purposes 
of this summary, I have called the smallest percentage of the 
population that can veto an amendment "V." Note that V, as 
calculated by the algorithm above, will occasionally give a higher 
figure than the actual minimum population sufficient to veto. 
When the total number of states in the Union is not evenly di-
visible by four, then the "three-fourths" of the states needed to 
amend will be the least number of states exceeding three-
fourths. The number of states needed to ratify will be rounded 
up rather than rounded down. When that happens, the comple-
mentary "one-fourth" of the states, rounded up, will suffice· to 
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veto, without the addition of another state. Hence, the figures 
below represent 25 % + 1 of the states, even though a mere 25 % 
has often sufficed to veto. Even though V as calculated may look 
low, one should realize that proper accounting for this round-off 
error would show an even lower V for many census years. 
1790 V= 13.32% 1890 V= 4.88% 
1800 V= 11.03% 1900 V= 4.58% 
1810 V= 12.11 % 1910 V= 5.11% 
1820 V= 6.17% 1920 V= 5.04% 
1830 V= 8.70% 1930 V= 4.74% 
1840 V= 8.29% 1940 V= 4.69% 
1850 V= 6.89% 1950 V= 4.69% 
1860 V= 6.87% 1960 V= 4.09% 
1870 V= 5.87% 1970 V= 4.07% 
1880 V= 5.79% 1980 V= 4.34% 
1780 
In 1780, there was no census and no Constitution. Before the 
decade of the 1780's was over, however, the constitutional con-
vention was called on February 21, 1787, and it convened on 
May 25, 1787. Congress formally proposed the Constitution writ-
ten by the convention on September 28, 1787. Under article VII 
of the new Constitution, the Constitution would be "estab-
lished" when nine states had ratified it, which occurred with the 
vote of New Hampshire on June 21, 1788. The vote was eventu-
ally made unanimous, which, not incidentally, was the require-
ment of the Articles of Confederation for its own amendment. 
The first ten adopted amendments, the Bill of Rights, were pro-
posed on September 25, 1789. The original proposed Bill of 
Rights contained twelve amendments, but two were defeated by 
the states. One concerned the apportionment of representatives, 
and the other would have prevented congressional salary in-
creases from taking effect until after the next election of 
representatives. 
Before the 1790 census, all thirteen of the original colonies, 
except Rhode Island, had become states of the United States of 
America. In their order of admission they were: Delaware (DE), 
1st, December 7, 1787; Pennsylvania (PA), 2d, December 12, 
1787; New Jersey (NJ), 3d, December 18, 1787; Georgia (GA), 
4th, January 2, 1788; Connecticut (CT), 5th, January 9, 1788; 
Massachusetts (MA), 6th, February 6, 1788; Maryland (MD), 
7th, April 28, 1788; South Carolina (SC), 8th, May 23, 1788; New 
Hampshire (NH), 9th, June 21, 1788; Virginia (VA), 10th, June 
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26, 1788; New York (NY), 11th, July 26, 1788; and North Caro-
lina (NC), 12th, November 21, 1789. 
1790 Census 
12 states; ¾ =9 
1. VA 692 
2. PA 434 
3. NC 394 
4. MA 379 this and following = L + 
5. NY 340 
6. MD 320 
7. SC 249 
8. CT 238 
9. NJ 184 this and preceding = M + 
10. NH 142 
11. GA 83 
12. DE 59 
Total = 3,514 
M = 3,230 = 91.91 % 
L = 1,994 = 56.74% 
Ratification of the Constitution became unanimous when 
Rhode Island voted to ratify on May 29, 1790. The Bill of Rights 
was ratified on December 15, 1791, when the eleventh (Virginia) 
of the then fourteen states voted to ratify. The eleventh amend-
ment was proposed on March 4, 1794, and ratified on January 8, 
1798. 
The following states were admitted during this decade: Rhode 
Island (RI), 13th, May 29, 1790; Vermont (VT), 14th, March 4, 
.1791; Kentucky (KY), 15th, June 1, 1792; and Tennessee (TN), 
16th, June 1, 1796. 
1800 Census 
16 states; ¾ = 12 
1. VA 808 
2. PA 602 
3. NY 589 
4. NC 478 
5. MA 423 this and following - L + 
6. SC 346 
7. MD 342 
8. CT 251 
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Total = 5,041 
M = 4,648 = 92.20 % 
L = 2,564 = 50.86 % 
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The twelfth amendment was proposed on December 9, 1803, 
and ratified on September 25, 1804. 
Ohio (OH) became the 17th state on March 1, 1803. 
1810 Census 
17 states; ¾ = 13 
1. NY 959 
2. VA 878 
3. PA 810 
4. NC 556 
5. MA 472 this and following = L + 
6. SC 415 · 
7. KY 407 
8. MD 381 
9. CT 262 
10. TN 262 
11. GA 252 
12. NJ 246 
13. OH 231 this and preceding = M t 
14. VT 218 
15. NH 214 
16. RI 77 
17. DE 73 
Total = 6,713 
M = 6,131 = 91.33% 
L = 3,510 = 52.29% 
The third amendment to be passed by Congress and defeated 
by the states (after the two in the original Bill of Rights) was 
proposed by the second session of the 11th Congress between 
March 1810 and March 1811. It would have stripped persons of 
U.S. citizenship for accepting any title, present, or office from a 
foreign power without the consent of Congress. 
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The following states were admitted during this decade: Louisi• 
ana (LA), 18th, April 30, 1812; Indiana (IN), 19th, December 11, 
1816; Mississippi (MS), 20th, December 10, 1817; Illinois (IL), 
21st, December 3, 1818; and Alabama (AL), 22d, December 14, 
1819. 
1820 Census 
22 states; ¾ = 17 
1. NY 1,373 
2. PA 1,049 
3. VA 938 
4. NC 639 
5. OH 581 
6. KY 564 this and following = L + 
7. MA 523 
8. SC 503 
9. TN 423 
10. MD 407 
11. GA 341 
12. NJ 278 
13. CT 275 
14. NH 244 
15. VT 236 
16. LA 153 
17. IN 147 this and preceding = M 1 
18. AL 128 
19. RI 83 
20. MS 75 
21. DE 73 
22. IL 55 
Total = 9,088 
M = 8,674 = 95.44 % 
L = 4,508 = 49.60% 
The following states were admitted this decade: Maine (ME), 
23d, March 15, 1820; and Missouri (MO), 24th, August 10, 1821. 
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1830 Census 
24 states; ¾ = 18 
1. NY 1,919 
2. PA 1,348 
3. VA 1,044 
4. OH 938 
5. NC 738 
6. KY 688 
7. TN 682 this and following = L ~ 
8. MA 610 
9. SC 581 
10. GA 517 
11. MD 447 
12. ME 399 
13. IN 343 
14. NJ 321 
15. AL 310 
16. CT 298 
17. VT 281 
18. NH 269 this and preceding = M t 19. LA 216 
20. IL 157 
21. MO 140 
22. MS 137 
23. RI 97 
24. DE 77 
Total = 12,557 
M = 11,733 = 93.44% 
L - 5,882 = 46.84 % 
The following states were admitted this decade: Arkansas 
(AR), 25th, June 15, 1836; and Michigan (Ml), 26th, January 26, 
1837. 
1840 Census 
26 states; ¾ = 20 
1. NY 2,429 
2. PA 1,724 
3. OH 1,519 
4. VA 1,025 
5. TN 829 
6. KY 780 
7. NC 753 this and following = L ~ 
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8. MA 738 
9. GA 691 
10. IN 686 
11. SC 594 
12. AL 591 
13. ME 502 
14. IL 476 
15. MD 470 
16. MO 384 
17. MS 376 
18. NJ 373 
19. LA 352 
20. CT 310 this and preceding = M t 
21. VT 292 
22. NH 285 
23. MI 212 
24. RI 109 
25. AR 98 
26. DE 78 
Total = 16,676 
M = 15,602 = 93.56 % 
L - 8,370 = 50.19% 
The following states were admitted this decade: Florida (FL), 
27th, March 3, 1845; Texas (TX), 28th; December 29, 1845; Iowa 
(IA), 29th, December 28, 1846; and Wisconsin (WI), 30th, May 
29, 1848. 
1850 Census 
30 states; ¾ = 23 
1. NY 3,097 
2. PA 2,312 
3. OH 1,980 
4. VA 1,119 
5. TN 1,003 
6. MA 995 
7. IN 988 
8. KY 982 this and following = L • 
9. GA 906 
10. NC 869 
11. IL 851 
12. AL 772 
13. MO 682 
14. SC 669 
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15. MS 607 
16. ME 583 
17. MD 583 
18. LA 518 
19. NJ 490 
20. MI 398 
21. CT 371 
22. NH 318 
23. VT 314 this and preceding = M t 
24. WI 305 
25. TX. 213 
26. AR 210 
27. IA 192 
28. RI 148 
29. DE 92 
30. FL 87 
Total = 22,654 
M = 21,407 = 94.50% 
L = 11,160 = 49.26% 
The following states were admitted this decade: California 
(CA), 31st, September 9, 1850; Minnesota (MN), 32d, May 11, 
1858; and Oregon (OR), 33d, February 14, 1859. 
1860 Census 
33 states; ¾ = 25 
1. NY 3,881 
2. PA 2,906 
3. OH 2,340 
4. IL 1,712 
5. IN 1,350 
6. MA 1,231 
7. VA 1,220 
8. MO 1,182 
9. KY 1,156 this and following = L i 
10. TN 1,110 
11. GA 1,057 
12. NC 993 
13. AL 964 
14. MS 791 
15. WI 776 
16. MI 749 
17. LA 708 
18. SC 704 
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19. MD 687 
20. IA 675 
21. NJ 672 
22. ME 628 
23. TX 604 
24. CT 460 
25. AR 435 this and preceding = M t 26. CA 380 
27. NH 326 
28. VT 315 
29. RI 175 
30. MN 172 
31. FL 140 
32. DE 112 
33. OR 52 
Total . 30,663 
M = 28,991 = 94.55 % 
L = 14,841 = 48.40% 
The thirteenth amendment was proposed on January 31, 1865, 
and ratified on December 18, 1865. The fourteenth amendment 
was proposed on June 13, 1866, and ratified on July 28, 1868. 
The fifteenth amendment was proposed on February 26, 1869. 
The fourth amendment to be passed by Congress and defeated 
by the states was proposed on March 2, 1861. It was the so~ 
called Corwin amendment and would have barred future amend-
ments authorizing Congress to interfere with the domestic insti-
tutions of the states, including slavery. 
The following states were admitted this decade: Kansas (KS), 
34th, January 29, 1861; West Virginia (WV), 35th, June 20, 1863; 
Nevada (NV), 36th, October 31, 1864; and Nebraska (NE), 37th, 
March 1, 1867. 
1870 Census 
37 states; ¾ = 28 
1. NY 4,383 
2. PA 3,522 
3. OH 2,665 
4. IL 2,540 
5. MO 1,721 
6. IN 1,681 
7. MA 1,457 
8. KY 1,321 
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9. TN 1,259 
10. VA 1,225 this and following = L i 
11. IA 1,194 
12. GA 1,184 
13. MI 1,184 
14. NC 1,071 
15. WI 1,055 
16. AL 997 
17. NJ 906 
18. MS 828 
19. TX 819 
20. MD 781 
21. LA 727 
22. SC 706 
23. ME 627 
24. CA 560 
25. CT 537 
26. AR 484 
27. WV 442 
28. MN 440 this and preceding = M t 
29. KS 364 
30. VT 331 
31. NH 318 
32. RI 217 
33. FL 188 
34. DE 125 
35. NE 123 
36. OR 91 
37. NV 42 
Total = 38,115 
M = 36,316 = 95.28% 
L = 17,566 = 46.09% 
The fifteenth amendment was ratified on March 30, 1870. 
Colorado (CO) became the 38th state on August 1, .1876. 
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1880 Census 
38 states; ¾ = 29 
1. NY 5,083 
2. PA 4,283 
3. OH 3,198 
4. IL 3,078 
5. MO 2,168 
6. IN 1,978 
7. MA 1,783 
8. KY 1,649 
9. MI 1,637 
10. IA 1,625 this and following = L + 
11. TX 1,592 
12. GA 1,542 
13. TN 1,542 
14. VA 1,513 
15. NC 1,400 
16. WI 1,315 
17. AL 1,263 
18. MS 1,132 
19. NJ 1,131 
20. KS 996 
21. SC 996 
22. LA 940 
23. MD 935 
24. CA 865 
25. AR 803 
26. MN 781 
27. ME 649 
28. CT 623 
29. WV 618 this and preceding = M t 
30. NE 452 
31. NH 347 
32. VT 332 
33. RI 277 
34. FL 269 
35. co 194 
36. OR 175 
37. DE 147 
38. NV 62 
Total = 49,363 
M = 47,118 = 95.45% 
L = 24,506 = 49.64 % 
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The following states were admitted this decade: North Dakota 
(ND), 39th, November 2, 1889; South Dakota (SD), 40th, No-
vember 2, 1889; Montana (MT), 41st, November 8, 1889; and 
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Total = 61,844 
M = 59,216 = 95.75% 
L = 29,735 = 48.08% 
The following states were admitted this decade: Idaho (ID), 
43d, July 3, 1890; Wyoming (WY), 44th, July 10, 1890; and Utah 















































































































Total = 72,610 
M = 69,717 = 96.02% 
L = 31,713 = 43.68% 
[VOL. 20:2 
The sixteenth amendment was proposed on July 12, 1909. 
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19. MN 2,076 
20. VA. 2,062 
21. MS 1,797 
22. KS 1,691 
23. OK 1,657 
24. LA 1,656 
25. AR 1,574 
26. SC 1,515 
27. MD 1,295 
28. WV 1,221 
29. NE 1,192 
30. WA 1,142 
31. CT 1,115 
32. co 799 
33. FL 753 
34. ME 742 
35. OR 673 this and preceding = M t 
36. SD 584 
37. ND 577 
38. RI 543 
39. NH 431 
40. MT 376 
41. UT 373 
42. VT 356 
43. ID 326 
44. DE 202 
45. WY 146 
46. NV 82 
Total = 91,410 
M = 87,414 = 95.63% 
L = 42,915 = 46.95% 
The sixteenth amendment was ratified on February 25, 1913. 
The seventeenth amendment was proposed on May 13, 1912, 
and ratified on May 31, 1913. The eighteenth amendment was 
proposed on December 18, 1917, and ratified on January 29, 
1919. The nineteenth amendment was proposed on June 4, 1919. 
The following states were admitted this decade: New Mexico 
(NM), 47th, January 6, 1912; and Arizona (AZ), 48th, February 
14, 1912. 
1920 Census 
48 states; ¾ = 36 
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1. NY 10,385 
2. PA 8,720 
3. IL 6,485 
4. OH 5,759 
5. TX 4,663 
6. MA 3,852 
7. MI 3,668 
8. CA 3,427 
9. MO 3,404 
10. NJ 3,156 
11. IN 2,930 
12. WI 2,632 
13. GA 2,896 this and following = L i 
14. NC 2,559 
15. KY 2,417 
16. IA 2,404 
17. MN 2,387 
18. AL 2,348 
19. TN 2,338 
20. VA 2,309 
21. OK 2,028 
22. LA 1,799 
23. MS 1,791 
24. KS 1,769 
25. AR 1,752 
26. SC 1,684 
27. WV 1,464 
28. MD 1,450 
29. CT 1,381 
30. WA 1,357 
31. NE 1,296 
32. FL 968 
33. co 940 
34. OR 783 
35. ME 768 
36. ND 647 this and preceding = M t 
37. SD 637 
38. RI 604 
39. MT 549 
40. UT 449 
41. NH 443 
42. ID 432 
43. NM 360 
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Total = 105,270 
M = 100,616 = 95.58% 
L = 46,189 = 43.88% 
The nineteenth amendment was ratified on August 26, 1920. 
The fifth amendment to be passed by Congress and defeated by 
the states was proposed in June 1924. It was the so-called Child 
Labor Amendment and would have given Congress the jurisdic-
tion to regulate the labor of those under 18 years of age. 
1930 Census 
48 states; ¾ = 36 
1. NY 12,588 
2. PA 9,631 
3. IL 7,631 
4. OH 6,647 
5. TX 5,825 
6. CA 5,677 
7. MI 4,842 
8. MA 4,250 
9. NJ 4,041 
10. MO 3,629 
11. IN 3,239 
12. NC 3,170 
13. WI 2,939 this and following = L + 
14. GA 2,909 
15. AL 2,646 
16. TN 2,617 
17. KY 2,615 
18. MN 2,564 
19. IA 2,471 
20. VA 2,422 
21. OK 2,396 
22. LA 2,102 
23. MS 2,010 
24. KS 1,881 
25. AR 1,854 
26. SC 1,739 
27. WV 1,729 











































Total = 122,290 
M = 117,192 = 95.83% 
L - 51,120 = 41.80% 
The twentieth amendment was proposed on March 2, 1932, 
and ratified on February 6, 1933. The twenty-first amendment 



















































































































Total = 131,006 
M = 125,577 = 95.86 % 
L = 54,982 = 41.97% 
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48 states; ¾ = 36 
14,830 
458 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
2. CA 10,586 
3. PA 10,498 
4. IL 8,712 
5. OH 7,947 
6. TX 7,711 
7. MI 6,372 
8. NJ 4,835 
9. MA 4,691 
10. NC 4,062 
11. MO 3,955 
12. IN 3,934 
13. GA 3,445 this and following = L i 
14. WI 3,435 
15. VA 3,319 
16. TN 3,292 
17. AL 3,062 
18. MN 2,982 
19. KY 2,945 
20. FL 2,771 
21. LA 2,684 
22. IA 2,621 
23. WA 2,379 
24. MD 2,343 
25. OK 2,233 
26. MS 2,179 
27. SC 2,117 
28. CT 2,007 
29. WV 2,006 
30. AR 1,910 
31. KS 1,905 
32. OR 1,521 
33. NE 1,326 
34. co 1,325 
35. ME 914 
36. RI 792 this and preceding = M t 
37. AZ 750 
38. UT 689 
39. NM 681 
40. SD 653 
41. ND 620 
42. MT 591 
43. ID 589 
44. NH 533 












Total = 149,899 
M = 143,646 = 95.83% 
L = 61,766 = 41.21 % 
459 
The twenty-second amendment was ratified on March 1, 1951. 
The following states were admitted this decade: Alaska (AK), 
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31. AR 1,786 
32. OR 1,769 
33. co 1,754 
34. NE 1,411 
35. AZ 1,302 
36. ME 969 
37. NM 951 
38. UT 891 this and preceding = M t 
39. RI 859 
40. SD 681 
41. MT 675 
42. ID 667 
43. HI 633 
44. ND 632 
45. NH 607 
46. DE 446 
47. VT 390 
48. WY 330 
49. NV 285 
50. AK 226 
Total = 178,612 
M = 172,181 = 96.39% 
L - 72,218 = 40.43 % 
The twenty-third amendment was proposed on June 17, 1960, 
and ratified on April 3, 1961. The twenty-fourth amendment was 
proposed on August 27, 1962, and ratified on February 4, 1964. 
The twenty-fifth amendment was proposed on July 6, 1965, and 
ratified on February 23, 1967. 
1970 Census 
50 states; ¾ = 38 
1. CA 19,953 
2. NY 18,237 
3. PA 11,794 
4. TX 11,197 
5. IL 11,114 
6. OH 10,652 
7. MI 8,875 
8. NJ 7,168 
9. FL 6,789 
10. MA 5,689 
11. IN 5,194 















































































Total = 202,455 
M = 195,197 = 96.42% 
L = 80,711 = 39.87 % 
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The twenty-sixth amendment was proposed on March 23, 
1971, and ratified on July 5, 1971. The sixth amendment to be 
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passed by Congress and defeated by the states was proposed on 
March 22, 1972. It was the Equal Rights Amendment and would 
have prohibited discrimination by the state and federal govern-














































































































































Total = 225,870 
M = 217,182 = 96.15% 
L = 92,869 = 41.12% 
463 
463 
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Table 2: The Possibility of Federalist Minority Amendment: 
Amendment by Amendment 
This table shows exactly which states comprised the adopting 
supermajority for each of the adopted constitutional amend-
ments, and which states comprised the unavailing supermajority 
for the Equal Rights Amendment. I have determined the popu-
lation of the "ratifying set" of states, and then calculated it as a 
percentage of the national population. 
The sign "(rec)" after a state indicates that the state voted to 
rescind its ratification. The sign "(rec)(rec)" indicates that it 
voted to rescind its rescission. Because rescissions have not tra-
ditionally been recognized, I have not subtracted rescinding 
states from the set of ratifying states. They are noted for readers 
who wish to calculate the effect of granting validity to rescis-
sions or who merely wish to see the frequency of rescission. 
The words "¾ attained" after a state indicate which state's 
vote sufficed to put the amendment over the threshold of three-
fourths of the states. The reader may thus see which states com-
prised the "first ¾" of the states to ratify. Typically, states con-
tinued to vote for (rarely against) ratification after the requisite 
three-fourths supermajority was attained. Moreover, the Secre-
tary of State or the Administrator of General Services commonly 
delayed the announcement of the amendment's validity as law, 
most likely to verify recent votes. The proclamation was usually 
not given immediately upon the attainment of the "first ¾,"but 
only after a few other states had ratified. 
The states listed under the rubric "no action" neither ratified 
nor rejected the amendment in question. They are listed here in 
descending order by population. 
There are three ways to measure the "ratifying set" of states .. 
Rather than favor one and exclude the others, I have included 
each: 
• Population 1: the states comprising the "first ¾ ," or the 
smallest number of states needed for ratification, counting 
consecutively from the first state to ratify; 
• Population 2: the states that had ratified by the time of the 
proclamation of validity; 
• Population 3: all the states that eventually ratified. 
I have compared each of the population figures calculated to 
the total population of the states then eligible to vote on amend-
ments. This comparison tells us whether any amendment re-
ceived only the ratifying votes of states representing a minority 
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of the national population. Calculating such "totals" requires se-
lecting a census year. I have usually selected the first prior cen-
sus year; although when an amendment was ratified late in a 
decade, I have given the figures for both the first prior and the 
first succeeding census years. When the first prior census year is 
used, one must add to it the populations of the states admitted 
to the Union between that census year and the year of ratifica-
tion. (The year of proposal is not used because newly admitted 
states are eligible to vote on amendments pending at the time of 
their admission.) As in table 1, all population figures are ex-
press~d in thousands. 
A summary of the data precedes the table. More complete 
summaries appear in the main text. 
The sequences of ratifying states used here are taken from the 
United States Constitution (proposals and ratifications), United 
States Code (1982). The interested reader may also find there 
the exact dates of each state's votes of ratification. Note that 
different authorities list the sequence of ratifying states, and 
even the dates of ratification, differently. Apparently, the dis-
crepancies are due to disagreement as to what precise act consti-
tutes ratification. For this reason, I have preferred the "official" 
data in the U.S. Code, knowing that in law the official and the 
real do not necessarily coincide. 
Summary of Table 2 
Although the potential for a minority to amend the Constitu-
tion has existed in sixteen of the twenty decades of the existence 
of the United States (see table 1), that potential has never actu-
alized. No amendment has been adopted by states representing 
only a minority of the national population, regardless of which 
of the three methods is used to calculate the size of the ratifying 
set of states: In fact, each amendment has been adopted by 
states representing a significant supermajority of the national 
population. The amendments receiving the smallest and iargest 
percentages of popular consent, measured by the populations of 
the ratifying states, are as follows. (The averages refer only to 
amendments adopted after the Bill of Rights.) 
Population 1: (states in the first ¾) 
Smallest: eighteenth amendment (1920 data) -
62.51 % 
Largest: twentieth amendment = 88.68 % 
Average: 79.56 % 
Population 2: (states ratifying at proclamation) 
466 Journal of Law Reform 
Smallest: eighteenth amendment (1910 data) 
67.76% 
Largest: twentieth amendment = 97.47% 
Average: 82.62% 
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Population 3: (all states eventually ratifying) 
Smallest: twenty-fourth amendment = 80.42% 




The following states voted to ratify the eleventh amendment, 













12. NC ¾ attained 
13. SC 
Proclamation 
No Action: PA, NJ, [TN]* 
Accounted for: 15 states (complete) 
The eleventh amendment was proposed in 1794 and ratified in 
1798 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1790 census data, 
the total population of the states eligible to vote on amendments 
in 1794 (the 1790 total from table 1 plus the 1790 populations of 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Kentucky) was 3,742. 
Population 1 = 2,875 = 76.83 % 
Population 2 = 3,124 = 83.48% 
Population 3 = Population 2 
*Note: Tennessee was admitted to the Union before the ratifi-
cation year, 1798, but was not listed in the United States Code 
as among the states acting on the eleventh amendment. 
Twelfth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twelfth amendment, in 
this order: 
1. NC 4. OH 
2. MD 5. PA 
3. KY 6. VT. 






Rejected: DE, MA, CT 
No Action: none 
12. GA 
13. NH ¾ attained 
14. TN 
Proclamation 
Accounted for: 17 states (complete) 
467 
The twelfth amendment was proposed in 1803 and ratified in 
1804 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1800 census data, 
the total population of the states eligible to vote on amendments 
in 1803 (the 1800 total from table 1 plus the 1800 population of 
Ohio) was 31,154. 
Population 1 = 4,212 = 82.81 % 
Population 2 = 4,318 = 84.90% 
Population 3 = Population 2 
Thirteenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the thirteenth amend-







































Accounted for: 36 states (complete) 
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The thirteenth amendment was proposed in 1865 and ratified 
in 1865 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1860 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1865 (the 1860 total from table 1 plus the 1860 
populations of Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada) was 31,154. 
Population 1 = 27,363 = 87 .83 % 
Population 2 = 27,415 = 88.00% 
Population 3 = 30,363 = 97.46% 
Fourteenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the fourteenth amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. CT 20. PA 
2. NH 21. MA 
3. TN 22. NE 
4. NJ (rec) 23; IA 
5. OR (rec) 24. AR 
I 
6. VT 25. FL 
7. OH (rec) 26. NC 
8. NY 27. LA 
9. KS 28. SC¾ attained 
10. IL 29. AL 
11. WV 30. GA 
12. MI Proclamation 
13. MN 31. VA 
14. ME 32. MS 
15. NV 33. TX 
16. IN 34. DE 
17. MO 35. MD 
18. RI 36. CA 
19. WI 37. KY 
Rejected: none 
No Action: none 
Accounted for: 37 states (complete) 
The fourteenth amendment was proposed in 1866 and ratified 
in 1868 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1860 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1868 (the 1860 total from table 1 plus the 1860 
populations of Kansas, West Virginia, Nevada, and Nebraska) 
was 31,183. 
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Population 1 = 24,212 = 77.64% 
Population 2 = 26,233 = 84.13% 
Population 3 = 31,183 = 100% 
Fifteenth Amendment 
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The following states voted to ratify the fifteenth amendment, 
in this order: 
1. NV 19. VT 
2. WV 20. MO 
3. IL 21. MN 
4. LA 22. MS 
5. NC 23. RI 
6. MI 24. KS 
7. WI 25. OH 
8. ME 26. GA 
9. MA 27. IA ¾ attained 
10. AR 28. NE 
11. SC 29. TX 
12. PA Proclamation 
13. NY (rec)(rec) 30. NJ 
14. IN 31. DE 
15. CT 32. OR 
16. FL 33. CA 
17. NH 34. KY 
18. VA 
Rejected: TN, MD 
No Action: AL 
Accounted for: 37 states (complete) 
The fifteenth amendment was proposed in 1869 and ratified in 
1870 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1870 census data, 
the total population of the states eligible to vote on amendments 
in 1870 (the 1870 total from table 1) was 38,115. 
Population 1 = 31,133 = 81.68% 
Population 2 = 32,075 = 84.15% 
Population 3 = 35,078 = 92.03 % 
Sixteenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the sixteenth amendment, 
in this order: · 
1. AL 3. SC 
2. KY 4. IL 
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5. MS 23. KS 
6. OK 24. MI 
7. MD 25. IA 
8. GA 26. MO 
9. TX 27. ME 
10. OH 28. TN 
11. ID 29. AR 
12. OR 30. WI 
13. WA 31. NY 
14. MT 32. AZ 
15. IN 33. MN 
16. CA 34. LA 
17. NV 35. WV 
18. SD 36. NM ¾ attained 
19. NE 37. MA 
20. NC 38. NH 
21. co Proclamation 
22. ND 
Rejected: CT, RI, VT 
No Action: PA, NJ, VA, FL, VT, DE, WY 
Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
The sixteenth amendment was proposed in 1909 and ratified 
in 1913 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1910 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1913 (the 1910 total from table 1 plus the 1910 
populations of New Mexico and Arizona) was 91,941. 
Population 1 = 72,310 = 78.65% 
Population 2 = 76,107 = 82.78% 
Population 3 = Population 2 
Seventeenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the seventeenth amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. MA 10. IA 
2. AZ 11. MT 
3. MN 12. ID 
4. NY 13. WV 
5. KS 14. co 
6. OR 15. NV 
7. NC 16. TX 
8. CA 17. WA 
9. MI 18. WY 
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19. AR 29. OH 
20. ME 30. MO 
21. IL 31. NM 
22. ND 32. NE 
23. WI 33. NJ 
24. IN 34. TN 
25. NH 35. PA 
26. VT 36. CT ¾ attained 
27. SD Proclamation 
28. OK 37. LA 
Rejected: UT 
No Action: GA, KY, AL, VA, MS, SC, MD, FL, RI, DE 
Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
The seventeenth amendment was proposed in 1912 and rati-
fied in 1913 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1910 cen-
sus data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1913 (the 1910 total from table 1 plus the 1910 
populations of New Mexico and Arizona) was 91,941. 
Population 1 = 74,708 = 81.26% 
Population 2 = Population 1 
Population 3 = 76,364 = 83.06 % 
Eighteenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the eighteenth amend-
ment, in this order: 






4. ND 21. WV 
5. SC 22. CA 
6. MD 23. TN 
7. MT 24. WA 
8. TX 25. AR 
9. DE 26. KS 
10. SD 27. AL 
11. MA 28. co 
12. AZ 29. IA 
13. GA 30. NH 
14. LA 31. OR 
15. FL 32. NE 
16. MI 33. NC 
17. OH 34. UT 
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35. MO 41. NY 
36. WY ¾ attained Proclamation 
37. MN 42. VT 
38. WI 43. PA 
39. NM 44. CT 
40. NV 45. NJ 
Rejected: RI 
No Action: IL, IN 
Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
The eighteenth amendment was proposed in 1917 and ratified 
in 1919 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1910 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1919 (the 1910 total from table 1 plus the 1910 
populations of New Mexico and Arizona) was 91,941. 
Population 1 = 57,479 = 62.52 % 
Population 2 = 62,298 = 67. 76 % 
Population 3 = 74,271 = 80. 78 % 
Using the 1920 census data, the total population of the same set 
of states was 105,270. 
Population 1 = 65,801 = 62.51 % 
Population 2 = 81,642 = 77.55% 
Population 3 = 95,251 = 90.48% 
Nineteenth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the nineteenth amend-









































Rejected: MS, DE 









Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
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The nineteenth amendment was proposed in 1919 and ratified 
in 1920 (exact dates in table 1). According to 1920 census data, 
the total population of the states eligible to vote on amendments 
in 1920 (the 1920 total from table 1) was 105,270. 
Population 1 = 85,510 = 81.23% 
Population 2 = Population 1 
Population 3 = 103,256 = 98.09 % 
Twentieth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twentieth amendment, 
in this order: 
1. VA 20. ND 
2. NY 21. MN-
3. MS 22. AZ 
4. AR 23. MT 
5. KY 24. NE 
6. NJ 25. OK 
7. SC 26. KS 
8. MI 27. OR 
9. ME 28. DE 
10. RI 29. WA 
11. IL 30. WY 
12. LA 31. IA 
13. WV 32. SD 
14. PA 33. TN 
15. IN 34. ID 
16. TX 35. NM 
17. AL 36. GA 
18. CA 37. MO 
19. NC 38. OH 
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Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
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The twentieth amendment was proposed in 1932 and ratified 
in 1933 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1930 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1933 (the 1930 total from table 1) was 122,290. 
Population 1 = 108,442 = 88.68 % 
Population 2 = 119,190 = 97.47% 
Population 3 = 122,290 = 100% 
Twenty-First Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twenty-first amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. MI 21. AZ 
2. WI 22. NV 
3. RI 23. VT 
4. WY 24. co 
5. NJ 25. WA 
6. DE 26. MN 
7. IN 27. ID 
8. MA 28. MD 
9. NY 29. VA 
10. IL 30. NM 
11. IA 31. FL 
12. CT 32. TX 
13. NH 33. KY 
14. CA 34. OH 
15. WV 35. PA 
16. AR 36. UT ¾ attained 
17. OR Proclamation 
18. AL 37. ME 
19. TN 38. MT 
20. MO 
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Rejected: SC 
No Action: NC, GA, OK, LA, MS, KS, NE, SD, ND 
Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
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The twenty-first amendment was proposed in 1932 and rati-
fied in 1933 (exact dates in table 1). According to 1930 census 
data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1933 (the 1930 total from table 1) was 122,290. 
Population 1 = 101,996 = 83.41 % 
Population 2 = Population 1 
Population 3 = 103,331 = 84.50% 
Twenty-Second Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twenty-second amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. ME 22. SD 
2. MI 23. ND 
3. IA 24. LA 
4. KS 25. MT 
5. NH 26. IN 
6. DE 27. ID 
7. IL 28. NM 
8. OR 29. WY 
9. co 30. AR 
10. CA 31. GA 
11. NJ 32. TN 
12. VT 33. TX 
13. OH 34. NV 
14. WI 35. UT 
15. PA 36. MN ¾ attained 
16. CT 37. NC 
17. MO Proclamation 
18. NE 38. SC 
19. VA 39. MD 
20. MS 40. FL 
21. NY 41. AL 
Rejected: OK, MA 
No Action: KY, WA, WV, RI, AZ 
Accounted for: 48 states (complete) 
The twenty-second amendment was proposed in 1947 and rat-
ified in 1951 (exact dates in table 1). According to 1950 census 
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data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1951 (the 1950 total from table 1) was 149,899. 
Population 1 = 119,748 = 79.89% 
Population 2 = 123,810 = 82.60% 
Population 3 = 134,103 = 89.46% 
Twenty-Third Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twenty-third amend-







































38. OH ¾ attained 
39. NH (rec)(rec)* 
Proclamation 
No Action: TX, FL, NC, VA, GA, AL, LA, KY, SC, MS 
Accounted for: 50 states (complete) 
The twenty-third amendment was proposed in 1960 and rati-
fied in 1961 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1960 cen-
sus data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1961 (the 1960 total from table 1) was 178,612. 
• Technically, New Hampshire did not rescind its prior rescission, but merely voted 
to ratify after voting to rescind an earlier ratification. 
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Population 1 = 135,705 = 75.98% 
Population 2 = Population 1 
Population 3 = Population 1 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
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The following states voted to ratify the twenty-fourth amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. IL 21. WA 
2. NJ 22. VT 
3. OR 23. NV 
4. MT 24. CT 
5. WV 25. TN 
6. NY 26. PA 
7. MD 27. WI 
8. CA 28. KS 
9. AK 29. MA 
10. RI 30. NE 
11. IN 31. FL 
12. UT 32. IA 
13. MI 33. DE 
14. co 34. MO 
15. OH 35. NH 
16. MN 36. KY 
17. NM 37. ME 
18. HI 38. SD ¾ attained 
19. ND 39. VA 
20. ID Proclamation 
Rejected: MS 
No Action: TX, NC, GA, AL, LA, SC, OK, AR, AZ, WY 
Accounted for: 50 states (complete) 
The twenty-fourth amendment was proposed in 1962 and rati-
fied in 1964 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1960 cen-
sus data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1964 (the 1960 total from table 1) was 178,612. 
Population 1 = 139,681 = 78.20% 
Population 2 = 143,648 = 80.42% 
Population 3 = Population 2 
478 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twenty-fifth amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. NE 25. VA 
2. WI 26. MS 
3. OK 27. NY 
4. MA 28. MD 
5. PA 29. MO 
6. KY 30. NH 
7. AZ 31. LA 
8. MI 32. TN 
9. IN 33. WY 
10. CA 34. WA 
11. AR 35. IA 
12. NJ 36. OR 
13. DE 37. MN 
14. UT 38. NV ¾ attained 
15. WV 39. CT 
16. ME 40. MT 
17. RI Proclamation 
18. co 41. SD 
19. NM 42. OH 
20. KS 43. AL 
21. VT 44. NC 
22. AK 45. IL 
23. ID 46. TX 
24. HI 47. FL 
Rejected: none 
No Action: GA, SC, ND 
Accounted for: 50 states (complete) 
The twenty-fifth amendment was proposed in 1965 and rati-
fied in 1967 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1960 cen-
sus data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1967 (the 1960 total from table 1) was 178,612. 
Population .1 = 125,621 = 70.33 % 
Population 2 = 128,831 = 72.13% 
Population 3 = 171,654 = 96.10 % 
According to the 1970 census data, the total population of the 
same set of states was 202,455. 
Population 1 = 141,986 = 70.13% 
Population 2 = 145,712 = 71.97% 
Population 3 = 194,656 = 96.15% 
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Twent~-Sixth Amendment 
The following states voted to ratify the twenty-sixth amend-
ment, in this order: 
1. CT 23. co 
2. DE 24. PA 
3. MN 25. TX 
4. TN 26. SC 
5. WA 27. WV 
6. HI 28. NH 
7. MA 29. AZ 
8. MT 30. RI 
9. AR 31. NY 
10. ID 32. OR 
11. IA 33. MO 
12. NE 34. ·WI 
13. NJ 35. IL 
14. KS 36. AL 
15. MI 37. OH 
16. AK 38. NC ¾ attained 
17. MD 39. OK 
18. IN Proclamation 
19. ME 40. VA 
20. VT 41. WY 
21. LA 42. GA 
22. CA 
Rejected: none 
No Action: FL, KY, MS, UT, NM, SD, ND, NV 
Accounted for: 50 states (complete) 
The twenty-sixth amendment was proposed in 1971 and rati-
fied in 1971 (exact dates in table 1). According to the 1970 cen-
sus data, the total population of the states eligible to vote on 
amendments in 1971 (the 1970 total from table 1) was 202,455. 
Population 1 = 174,253 = 86.07 % 
Population 2 = 176,812 = 87.33% 
Population 3 = 186,382 = 92.06 % 
---.. Equal Rights Amendment 
Although I have not treated the other defeated amendment 
proposals in this table, I make an exception for the ERA. Be-
cause the ERA has been proposed in Congress regularly since its 
expiration, though not yet sent back to the states for ratifica-
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tion, the data on its first trial by the states may interest its pro-
ponents and opponents. The following states voted to ratify the 
Equal Rights Amendment, in this order: 
1. HI 20. KY 
2. DE 21. PA 
3. NH 22. CA 
4. ID (rec) 23. WY 
5. IA 24. SD 
6. KS 25. OR 
7. NE (rec) 26. MN 
8. TX 27. NM 
9. TN (rec) 28. VT 
10. AK 29. CT 
11. RI 30. WA 
12. NJ 31. ME 
13. co 32. MT 
14. WV 33. OH 
15. WI 34. ND 
16. NY 35. IN 
17. MI 36. X 
18. MD 37. X 
19. MA 38. x needed to attain ¾ 
The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed in 1972 (exact 
date in table 1) and expired after a three year renewal on June 
30, 1982. According to 1980 census data, the total population of 
the states eligible to vote on amendments in 1982 (the 1980 total 
from table 1) was 225,870. 
The population of the states that had ratified by the time of 
expiration was: 
not counting rescissions = 158,401 = 70.13% 
counting rescissions = 151,295 = 69.02% 
Using 1970 census data, the same populations were: 
not counting rescissions = 145,861 = 72.05% 
counting rescissions = 139,741 = 69.02% 
480 
WINTER 1987) Amendments-Table 3 481 
Table 3: Discriminatory Impact of Population Changes 
In general, the citizens of the least populous three-fourths of 
the states have gained in voice and those of the most populous 
one-fourth have lost voice in the adoption of federal amend-
ments. For the veto of amendments, the citizens of the least 
populous one-fourth of the states represent the gainers of voice, 
and those of the most populous three-fourths are losers. The 
greater a state's population, the less voice each of its citizens has 
in the federal amending process. 
I remind the reader of the distinction drawn in Part IV of the 
text between the two types of groups that have lost voice in the 
federal amending process. One type of group has lost voice at 
the same rate as Americans in general because its members are 
spread evenly in· the heavily and lightly populated states. Al-
though such. groups have actually lost voice in the amending 
process, they are not victims of a discriminatory impact. A sec-
ond type of group has lost voice at a higher rate than Americans 
in general because its members are concentrated in the heavily 
populated states. In this table, I am concerned with identifying 
some groups of the second type-the victims of the discrimina-
tory impact of the concentration of the population. 
I have employed three mathematical methods to indicate 
whether a group is a victim of discriminatory impact. They are 
not tests so much as indicators. Each is designed to reveal 
whether that group is concentrated in the heavily populated 
states, that is, whether its members reside in the voice-losing 
states in higher proportions than Americans in general. 
1. The first indicator compares the percentage of Americans 
in the five most populous states with the percentage of the 
American blacks (for example) in those states. If the latter is 
significantly higher than the former, then I have considered this 
a sign that blacks are concentrated in the more populous states. 
2. The second indicator compares the percentage of Ameri-
cans in the five least populous states with the percentage of 
American blacks (for example) in those states. If the latter is 
significantly lower than the former, then that is a sign that 
blacks are not concentrated in the less populous states. The first 
indicator is more indicative of discrimination than the second 
indicator, for blacks may not be concentrated in either the most 
or least populous states. It is possible for the first indicator to 
show discrimination while this indicator shows none, and for this 
indicator to show discrimination while the first shows none. If a 
group is concentrated in the least populous states, then it has 
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actually gained voice in the amending process; it is possible for a 
group to lose by the first indicator and gain by the second indi-
cator. Net gains are not determined here because no groups that 
are candidates for gainers are tested here. 
3. The third indicator compares the average percentage of 
black residents (for example) in the five most populous states 
with the average percentage for the five least populous states. If 
the former is significantly higher than the latter, then that is 
considered a sign that blacks are concentrated in the more popu-
lous states. It is possible for this indicator to show discrimina-
tion while the first two indicators show none. 
By making these three comparisons, I hope to have compen-
sated for the inevitable crudity of letting five states at the top 
and bottom of the American population scale stand for the most 
and least populous states in general. For purposes of measuring 
this crudity, note that the voice-losing states (for adoption, not 
veto, of amendments) are only the most populous quarter, not 
the most populous half: thirteen, not twenty-five. Similarly, the 
voice-gaining states (for veto, not adoption) are also only thir-
teen, not twenty-five. To let five represent thirteen is not quite 
as crude as letting five represent twenty-five. 
All three indicators use 1980 census data. This shows the state 
of the discriminatory impact of the concentration of the popula-
tion in 1980. 
Discriminatory impact has been investigated for the following 
groups: blacks, hispanics, persons with income below the poverty 
line, members of labor unions, individuals (mostly women and 
children) receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
and unemployed members of the civilian work force. Unfortu-
nately, either time, data, or both were unavailable for the inves-
tigation of other groups that may have lost voice, the potential 
gaining groups, and the nineteen other census decades. I hope 
that such studies can be made soon to complete the picture left 
here. 
As in tables 1 and 2, the "total" of the United States popula-
tion is a total only of the Americans residing in states eligible to 
vote on constitutional amendments. This excludes, preemi-
nently, residents of the District of Columbia, 70.3 % of whom are 
black and 100% of whom are urban (1980 data). Excluding the 
District of Columbia from the federal amending process is itself 
a significant cause of the discriminatory loss of voice suffered by 
blacks and city dwellers. However one takes this situation into 
account, it underscores a discriminatory impact above and be-
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yond that shown here, which is limited to that revealed by the 
population distribution throughout the voting states. 
All numbers other than percentages are numbers of 
thousands. 
All data are taken or derived from the U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN 











































'ii, of state 
State Black that is 
pop.• pop.• Black 
23,669 1,819 7.69 
17,557 2,402 13.68 
14,228 1,710 12.02 
11,867 1,047 8.82 
11,419 1,675 14.67 
654 3 0.46 
596 96 16.11 
512 1 0.20 
471 3 0.64 
400 14 3.50 
Total U.S. Blacks 
Top Five States: 
26,495 
Black pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
'ii, of U.S. Blacks 
avg. state '};, of Blacks 
Bottom Five States: 
Black pop. 
'½, of U.S. pop. 
'½, of U.S. Blacks 
avg. state '};, of Blacks 
Discrimination by · 
the first indicator 
the second indicator 










yes, possibly insignificant 
yes 
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% of state % of 
State Hispanic that is American 
pop.• pop.• Hispanic Hispanics 
23,669 4,544 19.20 31.10 
17,557 1,659 9.45 11.36 
14,228 2,986 20.99 20.44 
11,867 154 1.30 0.01 
11,419 636 5.57 4.35 
654 4 0.61 0.03 
596 10 1.68 0,07 
512 3 0.59 0.02 
471 24 5.10 0.16 
400 71 17.75 0.49 
----·--·---------------·------·----------------·----------··-------·---·-----------·-------------
Total U.S. Hispanics 14,609 
Top Five States: 
Hispanic pop. 9,979 
% of U.S. pop. 34.86 
% of U.S. Hispanics 68.31 
avg. state % of Hispanics 13.45 
Bottom Five States: 
Hispanic pop. 112 
% of U.S. pop. 1.17 
% of U.S. Hispanics 0.77 
avg. state % of Hispanics 0.15 
Discrimination by 
the first indicator yes 
the second indicator yes, possibly insignificant 
the third indicator yes 
t The Census Bureau collected this data under the name "Spanish Origin" and 
emphasized that members of this group may be of any race. 
• All population figures are expressed in thousands. 
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Members of Labor Unions ("Unionists") 




CA 1 2 
NY 2 1 
TX 3 7 
PA 4 3 
IL 5 4 
least 
pop. 
ND 46 47 
DE 47 43 
VT 48 49 
WY 49 48 
AK 50 46 
Total U.S. Unionists 
Top Five States: 
Unionist pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
% of U.S. Unionists 
avg. state % of Unionists 
Bottom Five States: 
Unionist pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
% of U.S. Unionists 
avg. state % of Unionists 
Discrimination by 
the first indicator 
the second indicator 























% of state 












yes, possibly insignificant 
yes 















WINTER 1987) Amendments-Table 3 
Unemployed Workers In the Civilian Work Force 




CA 1 1 
NY 2 2 
TX 3 7 
PA 4 6 
IL 5 4 
least 
pop. 
ND 46 49 
DE 47 43 
VT 48 48 
WY 49 50 
AK 50 47 
Total U.S. Unempl. 
Top Five States: 
Unempl. pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
% of U.S. Unempl. 
avg. state % of Unempl. 
Bottom Five States: 
Unempl. pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
% of U.S. Unempl. 
avg. state % of Unempl. 
Discrimination by 
the first indicator 
the second indicator 























% of state· 












yes, possibly insignificant 
yes, possibly insignificant 
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Recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
("AFDCs") (Individuals, not Families) 


























Total U.S. AFDCs 
Top Five States: 
AFDC pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 












avg. state % of AFDCs 
Bottom Five States: 
AFDC pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
% of U.S. AFDCs 
avg. state % of AFDCs 
Discrimination by 
the first indicator 
the second indicator 
























% of state 
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Persons With Income Below the Poverty Level ("Poor") 
':o of state 
















Total U.S. Poor 
Top Five States: 
Poor pop. 
':,. of U.S. pop. 












avg. state <;;, of Poor 
Bottom Five States: 
Poor pop. 
% of U.S. pop. 
r:;, of U.S. Poor 
avg. state % of Poor 
Discrimination by 
the first indicator 
the second indicator 

































yes, possibly insignificant 
yes 
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Table 4: Relative Strength of Voice of Citizens of the Various 



















































:- ---- - TX [top quarter of pop. (24.6%)] 
5 
-•.- - - - NJ [second quarter of pop. (51.3%)] 
10, 
15 








60 __ ....., ___________ ,__ ___ ,._ _______ ...,. 
246810 20 30 40 
Units of Voice in the Federal Amending Process, 
Relative to California Citizens (Who Have One Unit) 
50 
A: These states represent the fewest citizens who can adopt an amendment 
(41.12% of U.S.). 
B: These states represent the fewest states who can veto an amendment 
(4.34% of U.S.). 
60 
A 
B 
